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Abstract 
 
Shifts in culture and technology have changed the manifestation of celebrity in 
modern society, culminating in the practice of internet microcelebrity, where one views 
followers as fans, produces content consistent with a personal brand, and engages in strategic 
interaction with devotees. This thesis examines how those effects have also changed how 
terrorists present themselves and operationalize celebrity status. An original typology of 
terrorist celebrity is presented: traditional, martyr, and internet micro-celebrity. Two in-depth 
case studies of terrorist micro-celebrities are analyzed: Anwar al-Awlaki of Al Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula and Junaid Hussain of the Islamic State. The case studies are examined 
through content analysis of social media postings, personal chat transcripts, as well as 
mainstream media coverage of the individuals used to reconstruct their biographies. 
Following mainstream trends, these terrorist internet celebrities have built personal brands 
that target specific communities. Awlaki targeted English-speaking Muslims living in the 
West and IS foreign fighters like Hussain often target young people in the fighter’s countries 
of origin. Their online personas are created to be relatable and engaging to those specific 
audiences. Ultimately, mainstream celebrity trends have bled into terrorist behavior. By 
creating brands and managing them through micro-celebrity practices, terrorists have 
effectively weaponized online celebrity, using it for recruitment and planning.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
In February 2016, Mohammad Nur Solikin, in Indonesia, opened the Telegram 
messaging application and shared a simple message with a man living in Syria that Solikin 
had never met: Solikin wanted to commit a terrorist attack.1 Could the stranger help him 
plan? Bahrun Naim, the man receiving the message, was a fighter with the Islamic State who 
emigrated to the caliphate in January 2015.2 Naim was very receptive, with one caveat—he 
wanted Solikin not to martyr himself, but to instead recruit an inconspicuous female suicide 
bomber and a few accomplices.3 Moreover, Naim wanted a high profile target, the 
Indonesian Presidential Palace. He instructed Solikin and his group over the internet on how 
to build a pressure cooker bomb, and even transferred money to pay for the materials.4 On 
December 10, 2016, Solikin and an accomplice drove to drop off the bomb.5 Shortly after 
Solikin left to go scout the target site, Indonesian special counterterrorism police forces 
knocked on the door, arrested the would-be bomber, and confiscated the bomb.6 
In terms of terrorist attacks, this process of recruitment and planning solely on the 
internet is relatively new, leading to the term “virtually-planned” plot or attack. A remotely-
directed, or virtually planned, attack occurs when a foreign fighter in Syria, the planner, 
contacts an Islamic State sympathizer and recruits, trains, and directs them using solely 
digital, and typically encrypted, communications.7 The potential operative is located in the 
                                                           
1 “Mothers to Bombers: The Evolution of Indonesian Women Extremists,” Institute for Policy Analysis of 
Conflict, IPAC Report No. 35, Jan. 31, 2017, 
http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2017/01/IPAC_Report_35.pdf, 22-23. 
2 R. Kim Cragin and Ari Weil, ““Virtual Planners” in the Arsenal of Islamic State External Operations,” Orbis 
62, no. 2 (Spring 2018), 304. 
3 IPAC, “Mothers to Bombers,” 23. 
4 Cragin and Weil, ““Virtual Planners,”” 308-309. 
5 Cragin and Weil, ““Virtual Planners,”” 309-10. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Andrew Zammit, “The Role of Virtual Planners in the 2015 Anzac Day Terror Plot,” Security Challenges 13, 
no. 1 (2017), 42-44. 
Weil 7 
 
foreign fighter’s country of origin or in a country where the fighter has language 
proficiency.8 Naim’s plot is only one of fifty-one such operations that the Islamic State 
planned.9 
Scholars and analysts have explored the mechanics of virtually planned attacks, their 
prevalence in comparison to more traditional forms of attacks, the effectiveness of these 
plots, and the methods of encryption used.10 However, there is one key element that has yet 
to be fully explored: why are these individuals contacting each other? And in cases such as 
Naim and Solikin, why would the recruit initiate first contact with the planner? 
In this case, the answer is clear: Naim was famous in Indonesian militant circles. He 
had masterminded several plots and attacks in the Indonesia, all while residing in Syria, and 
Solikin wanted to be a part of the next plot. Naim started a blog when he arrived in Syria and 
gathered a following in Indonesia.11 Solikin was a “long-time admirer” of Naim and devoted 
                                                           
8 Bridget Moreng, “ISIS’ Virtual Puppeteers,” Foreign Affairs, September 21, 2016, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-09-21/isis-virtual-puppeteers.   
9 Cragin and Weil, ““Virtual Planners,”” 302. 
10 For typologies and prevalence, see Clare Ellis, “With a Little Help from my Friends: An Exploration of the 
Tactical Use of Single-Actor Terrorism by the Islamic State,” Perspectives on Terrorism 10, no. 6 (December 
2016): 41-47; Petter Nesser, Anne Stenersen, and Emilie Oftedal, “Jihadi Terrorism in Europe: The IS-Effect,” 
Perspectives on Terrorism 10, no. 6 (December 2016): 3-24. For the effectiveness of virtual plots, see John 
Mueller, “The Cybercoaching of Terrorists: Cause for Alarm?,” CTC Sentinel 10, no. 9 (October 2017): 29-35. 
For the mechanics of virtual plots, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Madeleine Blackman, “ISIS’ Virtual Planners: 
A Critical Terrorist Innovation,” War on the Rocks, January 4, 2017; Moreng, “ISIS’ Virtual Puppeteers.”; 
Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens and Seamus Hughes, “The Threat to the United States from the Islamic State’s 
Virtual Entrepreneurs,” CTC Sentinel 10, no. 3 (March 2017): 1-8; Rukmini Callimachi, “Not ‘Lone Wolves’ 
After All: How ISIS Guides World’s Terror Plots from Afar,” New York Times, February 4, 2017; Thomas 
Joscelyn, “Terror Plots in Germany, France were ‘remote-controlled’ by Islamic State operatives,” Long War 
Journal, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, September 24, 2016, 
https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/09/terror-plots-in-germany-france-were-remote-controlled-by-
islamic-state-operatives.php; Zammit, “The Role of Virtual Planners”; R. Kim Cragin and Ari Weil, ““Virtual 
Planners””. 
11 “8 things to know about Muhammad Bahrun Naim, alleged mastermind of Jakarta attack,” The Straits Times, 
January 15, 2016, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/8-things-to-know-about-muhammad-bahrun-naim-
alleged-mastermind-of-jakarta-attack.  
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follower of his blog, and tried to reach out for six months before finally getting in contact 
with Naim.12 Naim was, in effect, an internet celebrity.  
As social media has proliferated, individuals without established celebrity or “a 
strong public identity” are able to gain large followings through postings online, leading to 
the notions of internet celebrity, “instafame,” and “micro-celebrity.”13 Social media allows 
for the development of internet celebrity through two key processes: impression 
management, where the user strategically chooses how to present themselves; and personal 
branding, where users promote their reputation through the use of profiles on different 
networks.14 Just as bloggers, YouTube video creators, and other internet personalities have 
become micro-celebrities through their personal brand online, so too have terrorists.15  
The recent case of the Islamic State’s social media usage brings up several questions 
that have largely been left out of terrorism studies research: how is terrorist internet celebrity 
constructed and what effect does it have on the recruitment and planning process for 
contemporary terrorist groups? These questions are broader in scope than just virtually 
planned attacks, and they go much further back in time than just the Islamic State. Celebrity 
consumption matters in mainstream culture, and it also matters in terrorist organizations and 
radical milieus for spreading ideology, inspiring followers, and recruiting members. In order 
to approach these questions, this thesis first examines the terrorism studies literature and 
research on the relationship between terrorist organizations and mass media. As celebrity is 
                                                           
12 IPAC, “Mothers to Bombers,” 22. Cragin and Weil, ““Virtual Planners,”” 304. 
13 Susie Khamis, Lawrence Ang, and Raymond Welling, “Self-branding, ‘micro-celebrity’ and the rise of Social 
Media Influencers,” Celebrity Studies 8, no. 2 (2017), 194-200. 
14 For impression management, see Nicole C. Kramer and Stephan Winter, “Impression Management 2.0: The 
Relationship of Self-Esteem, Extraversion, Self-Efficacy, and Self-Presentation Within Social Networking 
Sites,” Journal of Media Psychology 20, no. 3 (2008): 106-116; For personal branding, Dorie Clark, 
Reinventing You: Define Your Brand, Imagine Your Future, (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Publishing, 
2013). 
15 Khamis et al, 191-208. 
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largely excluded, the paper then turns to media and culture studies to establish the concept of 
celebrity and its applicability to the study of terrorism. Following the literature review, a 
study of historical and contemporary terrorist celebrity is conducted, with an analytic focus 
on two case studies of terrorist micro-celebrities. 
Literature Review 
The Dual Audiences of Terrorism 
In 1974 Brian Michael Jenkins, one of the pioneers of terrorism studies, aptly noted 
that “terrorism is theater.”16 To Jenkins, terrorist attacks were distinct from other forms of 
violence because the target is not those directly harmed in the act, but rather the broader 
audience who views and is impacted by the attack. While no singular definition of terrorism 
has ever been developed in the literature, this notion that terrorist attacks seek to have a wide 
psychological effect and have distinct victims and targets is included in many definitions. In 
Schmid and Jongman’s study of 109 definitions of terrorism, 51% included fear, 41.5% 
included psychological effects, and 37.5% included the victim-target differentiation to which 
Jenkin’s theater metaphor alludes.17  
Victim-target differentiation points to one audience, those the terrorist group wishes 
to intimidate or coerce. But the theater of terrorism has another audience: those whom 
terrorists wish to recruit. In their seminal work on the strategies of terrorism, Kydd and 
Walter point to two key audiences, the target government whom the terrorists want to coerce 
and individuals that terrorists want to sway.18 Thus, terrorists must use spectacular acts of 
                                                           
16 Brian M. Jenkins, “International Terrorism: A New Kind of Warfare,” RAND Corporation, RAND Paper 
Series, June 1974, 4.  
17 Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data 
Bases, Theories, and Literature (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988), 5-6. 
18 Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, "The Strategies of Terrorism," International Security 31, no. 1 
(2006), 58.  
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violence to speak to both audiences. One attack and the publicity surrounding it may create a 
sense of fear in the target population and simultaneously demonstrate strength to supporters.  
Due to the target-victim differentiation involved in terrorist acts and these two 
audiences, terrorists and terrorist organizations are inherently dependent on some form of 
media and communication to spread their message. The early, anarchist wave of terrorists 
developed the notion of “propaganda by deed,” where their violent actions would speak to a 
larger audience about the group’s goals.19 Yet without mass media tools of either news 
coverage or self-published communiqués and manifestos, news of the attack may not spread 
and the terrorists may not reach their target audience. 
Thus, for the majority of the 20th century, terrorist organizations were dependent on 
media outlets to ensure public attention to their attacks. The early European anarchists relied 
on pamphlet distribution to explain their attacks, but only reached a limited audience.20 
Menachem Begin’s “glass house” strategy used spectacular attacks on targets representative 
of British prestige in order to gain attention in the British and international media, discredit 
the British, and force them to leave Mandatory Palestine.21 
Terrorism and Modern Mass Media 
This media dependency only increased as terrorist attacks moved out of the domestic 
realm and took an increasingly transnational and international nature. Hoffman argues that 
1968 presents two key turning points in terrorism: the start of modern international terrorism 
with Palestinian aircraft hijackings in Europe and the launch of the first television satellite, 
                                                           
19 David C. Rapaport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” in Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand 
Strategy, ed. Audrey Kurth Cronin and James Ludes (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 
50-2. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 3rd edition, (New York: Columbia, 2017), 5.  
20 Gabriel Weimann and Conrad Winn, The Theater of Terror: Mass Media and International Terrorism (New 
York City: Longman Publishing, 1994), 53. 
21 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 49-55. Weimann and Winn, Theater of Terror, 54 
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which allowed for faster coverage of international terrorist events.22 By the early 1970s, 
improved broadcasting technology allowed for the live coverage of the terrorist attack on the 
Munich Olympics, captivating viewers around the world.23  
This led to what ABC broadcaster Ted Koppel described as a “symbiotic 
relationship,” where the media needs exciting stories to cover and terrorists need an outlet to 
spread their exploits and message.24 Increasingly, terrorists began to see their attacks as what 
Brigette Nacos termed a “media event,” a premeditated spectacle meant to garner coverage.25 
Terrorists could harness the increasingly broad reach of the news media in the 1970s and 80s 
to spread their message to a larger audience. In order to maximize the effect, Jenkins, in a 
continuation of his theater metaphor, argued that “terrorist attacks are often carefully 
choreographed to attract the attention of the electronic media and the international press.”26 
The hostage-taking and airplane hijacking that became prevalent in the 1970s and 80s is 
demonstrative of this trend, because both tactics can be made into drawn-out events that 
maximize media coverage. 
Terrorism and the Internet 
However, towards the end of the 20th century, a shifting media and communications 
landscape enabled terrorists to reach their target audience and supporters in new ways, often 
circumventing traditional media entirely. The internet enabled terrorist organizations to reach 
out directly to both supporters whom terrorists wish to sway and the target audience whom 
terrorists wish to coerce. American neo-Nazis were the first to acknowledge the potential use 
                                                           
22 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 187. 
23 Idem, 188. 
24 Quoted in Weimann and Winn, Theater of Terror, 51. 
25 Brigitte Nacos, Mass-mediated Terrorism: Mainstream and Digital Media in Terrorism and 
Counterterrorism (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), xiv. 
26 Jenkins, “International Terrorism,” 4. 
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of the internet by radical groups.27 In the early 1980s, three far-right electronic bulletin 
boards were launched.28 While the boards did not have wide readership, they were used in 
1983 by former Texas Grand Dragon Louis Beam to release an essay titled “Leaderless 
Resistance.”29 Beam spelled out a new strategy of autonomous units operating independently 
whose attacks would combine for a greater effect without the traditional pitfalls of 
hierarchical terrorist organizations that could be more easily disrupted by law enforcement.30 
The internet would serve as a medium through which disparate cells and sympathetic 
individuals could be educated in the movement’s ideology and tactics.31 
 While Beam’s dream of a white supremacist revolution did not materialize, the 
American far right message boards of the 1980s demonstrated the start of a new approach to 
terrorist communications and networking. Since then, terrorists have continued to expand 
their use of digital tools. Over the last forty years, terrorist use of the internet can be 
envisioned in three distinct, but not entirely separate or exclusive, stages. The first terrorist 
websites lasted from the 1980s until the early 2000s, then a focus on training led to a second 
stage in the early to mid-2000s, and finally the rise of social media enabled the third and 
current stage. 
From the 1980s to the early 2000s, the first stage involved the creation of terrorist 
websites primarily to post news, share ideological documents, and elicit donations. This first 
stage represents a traditional, one-to-many, form of communication.32 In many ways, early 
                                                           
27 Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, Audrey Alexander, and Nick Kaderbhai, “The impact of digital 
communications technology on radicalization and recruitment,” International Affairs 93, no. 5 (2017), 1234. 
28 George Michael, “The New Media and the Rise of Exhortatory Terrorism,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 7, no. 
1 (Spring 2013), 42. 
29 Michael, “The New Media,” 43. 
30 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 122-3. 
31 Michael, “The New Media,” 43. 
32 John Curtis Amble, “Combating Terrorism in the New Media Environment,” Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism 35, no. 5 (2012), 340. 
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terrorist websites provided a parallel structure to old media by providing their supporters 
with news of their exploits straight from the source. In 1995, the Tamil Tigers’ first website 
served this purpose, circumventing the state-controlled media to deliver news of the group’s 
attacks through their website.33 This enabled the group to speak to both audiences: the 
website’s news feature emboldened potential supporters by demonstrating strength and 
evinced fear in the target population who were suddenly hearing about many more attacks. 
Gabriel Weimann’s study of the early uses of the internet by terrorist groups shows that 
websites were also used to post ideological documents and elicit donations from supporters.34 
This enabled terrorist groups to interact with supporters worldwide in new ways, although, 
with the exception of donations, the interaction was largely unidirectional at this point. 
Terrorist websites sought to inform supporters and targets of the organization’s goals, but did 
not enable the supporters to fully interact with the organization yet.  
At the turn of the century, the number and diversity of terrorist websites increased 
drastically. In 1998, fewer than 15 groups had websites and by 2005, there were 4,300 
terrorist websites representing a broad range of groups.35 With this growth came a shift in 
how terrorists used the internet. The second stage, beginning in the late 1990s and going until 
the mid to late 2000s, involved an increased focus on training supporters through how-to 
guides and online discussion forums. As then-FBI Director Robert Mueller noted in 2007, 
“the information age means you don’t need training camps to become a terrorist; all you need 
is an Internet connection.”36 Perhaps the quintessential example is Al Qaeda in the Arabian 
                                                           
33 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 213. 
34 Gabriel Weimann, “www.terror.net—How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet,” United States Institute of 
Peace, Special Report 116, March 2004.  
35 Amble, “Combatting Terrorism,” 341. 
36 Quoted in Evan K Kohlman, ““Homegrown” Terrorists: Theory and Cases in the War on Terror’s Newest 
Front,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 618, no. 1 (2008), 99. 
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Peninsula’s (AQAP) famous Al-Battar Camp magazine. Released from January to October of 
2004, the magazine included articles on a range of training topics, including physical 
training, communications, and tactics.37 Al Battar is known for the famous line included on 
the last page: “you don’t have to travel to other lands…you too can begin the training 
program. You can join the al-Battar Camp.”38 Thus, terrorism studies scholars began to 
describe the internet as a “virtual training camp.”39 One analyst warned of the danger of 
“cyberplanning”: the prospect for terrorists to use the internet to train, coordinate, and plan 
attacks.40 
To be sure, terrorist and anarchist instructional materials had existed and been 
circulated for years.41 As early as 1885, anarchists such as Johann Most were writing essays 
and delivering speeches that explained how to build a bomb.42 Carlos Marighella’s famous 
Minimanual of the Urban Guerilla taught tactics to guerillas and terrorists from Uruguay to 
West Germany.43 Training manuals were not invented at the turn of the century; rather, the 
internet allowed violent non-state actors to spread their training manuals to anyone with an 
internet connection, a far larger audience than ever before. However, the feared 
“cyberplanned” attacks largely did not materialize. As Anne Stenersen showed, rather than 
running an organized program to virtually train followers, Al Qaeda was instead using the 
                                                           
37 Anne Stenersen, “The Internet: A Virtual Training Camp?” Terrorism and Political Violence 20, no. 2 
(2008), 223. 
38 Stenersen, “Virtual Training Camp,” 224. 
39 Gabriel Weimann, “Virtual Training Camps: Terrorist’ Use of the Internet,” in James JF Forest, ed., Teaching 
Terror: Strategic and Tactical Learning in the Terrorist World (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield, 2006), 110-132. 
40 Timothy L. Thomas, “Al Qaeda and the Internet: The Danger of “Cyberplanning,” Parameters 33, no. 1 
(Spring 2003), 112-113, 117-118. 
41 Nacos, Mass-mediated Terrorism, 49-67. 
42 Nacos, Mass-mediated Terrorism, 49-53. 
43 Idem, 59. 
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internet to create a library where sympathizers could seek out materials and manuals.44 This 
one-way directionality meant few attacks were attributed to online training materials. 
 With the rise of social media, a third stage began in the late 2000s and continues to 
the present day. Whereas traditional media and the first stage were marked by the one-to-
many model, social media allows for “many-to-many” communications.45 Terrorist 
organizations are not only able to reach a broader audience, but now their worldwide 
adherents can interact with them. The Islamic State has excelled at the use of social media 
through the use of “tailored online interventions.”46 Islamic State recruiters monitor social 
media feeds of potential recruits to look for anti-Western sentiment, and then groom the 
recruit through repeated interactions leading to a potential action, from immigrating to Syria 
to conducting a domestic attack or merely helping to spread propaganda.47  
 Another case of the Islamic State’s media-savvy approach is their beheading videos, 
which provide perhaps the best example of how the media landscape has changed how 
terrorists communicate with multiple audiences. The Islamic State’s rapid rise in the summer 
of 2014 was followed by a series of videos in autumn of that year depicting Islamic State 
fighters beheading captured western journalists and aid workers.48 The videotaped beheading 
is not a new tactic—it was first introduced in the 1990s by terrorists in Chechnya and was a 
hallmark of the Islamic State predecessor, Al Qaeda in Iraq—but the Islamic State 
disseminated the videos more widely than previous groups and the brutality displayed 
                                                           
44 Stenersen, “Virtual Training Camp”. 
45 Amble, “Combatting Terrorism,” 340. 
46 J.M. Berger, “Tailored Online Interventions: The Islamic State’s Recruitment Strategy,” CTC Sentinel 8, no. 
10 (October 2015), 19. 
47 Berger, “Tailored Online Interventions,” 21-2. 
48 Simone Molin Friis, "‘Beyond anything we have ever seen’: beheading videos and the visibility of violence in 
the war against ISIS," International Affairs 91, no. 4 (2015), 725-6. 
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became an essential part of the group’s brand.49 To Western audiences, the videos were a 
clear threat. Cragin and Padilla point to an article in the Islamic State magazine Dabiq that 
rationalized the James Foley beheading because the United States government treated the 
issue with “apathy”; this rhetoric is targeted to make western civilians feel that their 
governments cannot or will not protect them.50 Yet that same brutality was a tool of 
recruitment. The videos sent a message that the Islamic State was in control of territory, and 
it would not hesitate to enforce its vicious rule of law within that territory. It was this brutal 
brand that attracted thousands of fighters who joined the fledgling caliphate in 2014. 
As noted previously, these stages are not exclusive. While the primary use of the 
internet has shifted to social media platforms, terrorist groups still produce online magazines 
and other training materials. Since 2010, AQAP has produced a magazine titled Inspire that 
contains a training section under the name “Open Source Jihad.”51 However, the majority of 
terrorist activity online has moved to social media platforms, becoming the predominant 
space for terrorist organizations to spread their message and interact with followers.52  
Additionally, this third stage allows for the inclusion of new informally-affiliated 
terrorist actors and for the actualization of the “cyberplanned” terrorist attack that Thomas 
warned of in 2003.53 In his study of terrorist cooperation, Assaf Moghadam identified the 
internet as the medium through which informal and formal agents of terrorism are able to 
                                                           
49 Friis, “Beyond anything we have ever seen,” 729. 
50 Quoted in R. Kim Cragin and Phillip Padilla, “Old Becomes New Again: Kidnappings by Daesh and Other 
Salafi-Jihadists in the Twenty-First Century,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 40, no. 8 (2017), 674-5. 
51 Alastair Reed and Haroro J. Ingram, “Exploring the Role of Instructional Material in AQAP’s Inspire and 
ISIS’ Rumiyah,” Europol Report, May 26, 2017. 
52 Yuki Noguchi, “Tracking Terrorists Online,” The Washington Post, Live Q&As, April 19, 2006, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/discussion/2006/04/11/DI2006041100626.html.   
53 Thomas, “Al Qaeda and the Internet,” 112-113, 117-118. 
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collaborate.54 The networked and interactive nature of social media allows any individual 
“entrepreneur” to receive the training, guidance, and inspiration they require from an 
organization to carry out their own attack.55 Over the last decade, terrorists have used the 
internet to successfully inspire and direct attacks and plots by individuals around the world 
who have only interacted with the organization online. 
Thus, it is clear that as media has diversified, terrorists have been able to spread their 
message to a wider audience and the traditional media-terrorist relationship has drastically 
shifted. Terrorists once craved media interviews in order to spread their message, yet today 
they behead journalists to the same effect. No longer entirely dependent on traditional media, 
terrorists can now use a broad variety of digital platforms to produce their own content, 
promote their ideology, recruit new fighters, command remote cells or unconnected 
sympathizers, and inspire adherents around the world. 
While terrorism studies research has explored these various changes in terrorist use of 
the internet, the field has not adequately addressed the power of web 2.0 to build the brands 
of specific terrorists and raise the profile of individuals. The literature leaves out a parallel 
and important change—that with the expansion of information technology and changing 
consumer habits, the nature of celebrity itself has drastically shifted. An ordinary individual 
is now able to become famous by posting videos or blogging, and terrorists are not separate 
from these changes. Previous terrorists were dependent on the media to raise their individual 
profile, but today they can create their own heightened status through the use of the internet. 
Take, for example, the famous American internet preacher and AQAP ideologue Anwar al-
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Awlaki, whose internet lectures reached thousands through YouTube and made him a 
celebrity in the global Salafi jihad movement. More recently, the infamous masked IS 
executioner Jihadi John became a household name after IS uploaded a video of him 
beheading James Foley.56 Both used the tools of the internet to derive a newfound status, 
demonstrating that terrorism is not detached from broader trends in social media use and 
consumption. However, this shift has yet to be fully explored in field of terrorism studies. 
The lacuna in the literature prevents a complete understanding of how technological and 
cultural changes work together to provide the context for changes in the manifestation of 
terrorism. Thus, it is worthwhile to examine the celebrity, media, and culture studies 
literature to understand how the concept of celebrity has changed with the expansion of 
digital platforms.  
The Concept of Celebrity 
Scholars have situated the beginnings of the modern concept of celebrity in the mid-
eighteenth century.57 Inglis argues that this point in time represents the convergence of 
several factors that enabled the transition from an age-old framework of fame and renown to 
the new concept of modern celebrity: “the rise of urban democracy, the two-hundred-year 
expansion of its media of communication, together with the radical individualisation of the 
modern sensibility made fame a much more transitory reward and changed public acclaim 
from an expression of devotion into one of celebrity.”58  
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How is celebrity separate from renown? As Studlar argues, “it is not automatically 
moored to significant accomplishment(s) in traditional arenas of cultural contribution.”59 For 
centuries, certain figures (royalty, accomplished generals, famous writers, politicians, etc.) 
had achieved fame and even heroic status for their accomplishments.60 In turn, renown 
“brought honour to the office not the individual, and public recognition was not so much of 
the man himself as of the significance of his actions for the society.”61 In contrast, celebrity is 
about the individual themselves. While a celebrity can be someone with significant 
accomplishments, their status is ultimately derived from the public knowing them—as 
Boorstin noted, being “known for his well-knownness.”62  
In this sense, as Marshall presents, there are two key elements from which celebrity 
derives power: individuality and visibility.63 Celebrities present unique personas that are then 
promulgated through available forms of media.64 In turn, it is both the media and the 
consumer who combine to create a celebrity. Boorstin aptly noted that the celebrity “is made 
by all of us who willingly read about him, who like to see him on television, who buy 
recordings of his voice, and talk about him to our friends.”65 Other scholars have added a 
third element: intimacy. A person of renown was far away and untouchable; in contrast, a 
celebrity is someone the public thinks they know intimately. Tellingly, Shickel titled his 
1985 study of contemporary celebrity culture Intimate Strangers. One may never meet a 
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specific celebrity, but the highly visible nature of their persona as spread through media 
makes the public “think we know what makes them tick.”66 
One additional factor is highlighted primarily in the sociological literature on 
organizations and leadership: the quality of charisma. The previous three elements: 
individuality, visibility, and intimacy, are all definitional: a public figure needs them to 
maintain celebrity status. In contrast, charisma is not necessary but is rather a quality with 
which one can improve the three key factors of celebrity. Max Weber codified three pure 
ways in which individuals gain and keep legitimacy: rational, a legal form of authority; 
traditional, based on lineage or ordained rule; or charismatic, authority based on devotion to 
an individual with exemplary qualities.67  Weber never connected this to celebrity, but his 
description lines up exactly with celebrity’s key function of an audience or consumer: he 
argued that no attempt to judge the individual’s quality mattered, but rather “what is alone 
important is how the individual is actually regarded by those subject to his charismatic 
authority, by his “followers” or disciples.””68 Thus, a particular skill in oration, interpersonal 
interactions, or some other quality can allow the celebrity in question to gain a following. If 
the followers are particularly swayed, they will endow that individual with authority and the 
followers may even become devotees. 
Thus, celebrity is inherently reliant on mass media to maximize the number of people 
who are familiar with each celebrity’s individual persona. Due to this dependency, the 
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manifestation of these three elements has changed over time with the introduction of new 
media and communications technologies.  
History of Celebrity 
In the nineteenth century, celebrities were dependent on print media to promote the 
individual persona that the celebrity was presenting. The introduction of the telegraph, 
telephone, photography, and further advances in mass printing all contributed to a new and 
richer media landscape. Take, for example, an entertainment celebrity such as Buffalo Bill. 
These new communications technologies were used to promote his appearances while dime 
novels kept fans entertained and enthralled with his persona between performances.69 
 The turn of the century also marked a new media landscape; one in which celebrity 
was not entirely reliant on print media but rather could be propagated through radio, movies, 
or television.70 A telegraph or pamphlet could only do so much—now the masses could 
experience celebrity personas by hearing their voices and seeing them in a moving picture. 
Giles points to the way celebrity was manufactured in Hollywood: by the 1910s and 20s, 
movie studios began signing contracts with specific actors and turning them into star 
personalities whom audiences would flock to see on screen.71 Studios created cults of 
personality through interviews, magazine profiles, and billboards, which in turn solidified the 
actor’s unique image in the public’s eye.72 Television went even further by bringing the stars 
into one’s living room, effectively integrating them “into the everyday and the domestic flow 
of life.”73 
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At the end of the 20th century, celebrity went through another change that once again 
affected the key elements of individuality, visibility, and intimacy. In Gabler’s model of 
celebrity supply and demand, the increased demand for celebrities led the media to create 
more celebrities outside of the traditional fields of sports and entertainment.74 In particular, 
scholars highlight the rise of reality television in the 1990s as a major turning point, 
representing the diversification of who could become a celebrity.75 Reality television not only 
elevated ordinary individuals to high levels of visibility, it did so by giving viewers an 
intimate look into the star’s everyday life. Take Maureen Reece, who became famous on the 
1997 BBC series Driving School, a reality show that documented learning drivers. Reece had 
previously failed seven tests, and the show documented her continuing struggle to pass.76 
Before long, she was a household name in Britain with newspapers and other shows running 
profiles of her, and the series finale garnered 12 million viewers.77 In no previous era could 
someone have become famous for failing seven driving tests. Yet the changing media 
landscape allowed for the creation of a new class of celebrity. Suddenly, anyone, not just a 
movie star, musician, or football player, could be famous for their individualism if they 
received enough visibility. 
Fame on the Internet: Microcelebrity 
The internet solidified this transformation by fully challenging the pre-existing 
modern celebrity system, which relied on a media production process separate from the 
celebrity in question. New digital tools revamped the processes through which individuality 
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and visibility can be attained. No longer was an individual reliant on the print or visual media 
to increase their visibility. Rather, the explosion of online platforms allowed anyone to post 
content and increase their own visibility, sharing text, photos, or videos with a few to 
millions of followers. Celebrification, the process through which ordinary people become 
celebrities, was occurring at faster rates and with lower barriers to entry.78 The late twentieth 
century saw the rise of bloggers, while the early twenty-first gave way to “YouTubers,” 
“vloggers,” the “instafamous,” and other forms of internet celebrity, often typified by the 
content they produce.  
Enabling the greater frequency of celebrification is a larger process labeled 
celebritization. Driessens defines this as a meta-process that has changed the accessibility of 
celebrity in society and culture.79 He highlights three indicators of this process: 
democratization, the increased access of a wide range of individuals to celebrity status; 
diversification, the opening of celebrity to new areas other than entertainment as Gabler 
described; and migration, the movement of celebrities between two different fields, such as 
Arnold Schwarzenegger’s move into politics.80 These indicators are driven by three engines: 
mediatization, the manner in which the media shapes discourse; personalization, the 
increasing importance of the individual as opposed to the collective; and commodification, 
the process of giving an individual an economic value based on their status and profiting 
from that value.81 None of these engines are new, but the new revolution in communications 
technology has sped up these processes with respect to celebrity.  
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At the heart of the democratization of celebrity on the internet is the manner in which 
individuals present themselves. In her seminal 2001 study of women using webcams (so-
called “camgirls”), Senft coined the term “micro-celebrity.”82 At face value, micro-celebrity 
is a status, “the state of being famous to a niche group of people.”83 Yet micro-celebrity is 
much more than merely a status. Senft observed micro-celebrity as a set of actions –“the 
commitment to deploying and maintaining one’s online identity as if it were a branded good, 
with the expectation that others do the same.”84 Each camgirl was broadcasting her daily life, 
and as such was cultivating and presenting a unique persona that she needed to maintain with 
a semblance of consistency and authenticity. 
The practices of micro-celebrity mirror those of traditional celebrity: presenting a 
unique persona, viewing followers as fans, producing content consistent with that persona, 
and engaging in strategic interaction with the goal of maximizing both intimacy and 
continued visibility.85 Micro-celebrity is thus “a way of thinking of oneself as a celebrity.”86 
However, in contrast to traditional celebrities, micro-celebrities carry “fame that is native to 
social media.”87  Take, for example, the “Youtuber” as a micro-celebrity. The label 
“Youtuber” refers to someone who creates and posts videos on the video-hosting site 
Youtube.com. This may come in many forms; prominent channels have included content 
such as pranks, beauty tutorials, music reviews, comedic skits, and countless more. Each one 
                                                           
82 Theresa M. Senft, Camgirls: Celebrity & Community in the Age of Social Networks (New York: Peter Lang 
Publishing, 2008). 
83 Alice Marwick, Status Update: Celebrity, Publicity, and Branding in the Social Media Age, (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2013), 114, EBSCOhost eBook Collection. 
84 Theresa M. Senft, “Microcelebrity and the Branded Self,” in A Companion to New Media Dynamics, ed. John 
Hartley, Jean Burgess, and Axel Bruns (West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing, 2013), 346, Wiley Online Library. 
85 Alice E. Marwick, “You May Know Me from Youtube: (Micro-)Celebrity in Social Media,” in A Companion 
to Celebrity, ed. P. David Marshall and Sean Redmond, (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2015), 337, Wiley 
Online Library. 
86 Marwick, Status Update, 115. 
87 Marwick, “You May Know Me from Youtube,” 338. 
Weil 25 
 
cultivates a specific image that appeals to a target audience, and by keeping content 
consistent, they can effectively manage their brand. Many prominent Youtubers have created 
a second channel for behind the scenes videos (“BTS”) and video blogs (“vlogs”) that detail 
their daily lives outside of the channel content, proving a chance for fans to feel a sense of 
intimacy. 
The rise of individualism highlighted by Driessens has a distinct impact on the 
internet environment for micro-celebrity. With increased media access and saturation, “the 
premium on distinctiveness and visibility grows.”88 Micro-celebrity practitioners are 
competing for attention, and each is developing a distinctive brand with which to attract 
visibility. As Senft succinctly described, the micro-celebrity “must brand or die.”89 And 
social media platforms provide built-in metrics to determine each user’s success in branding, 
namely how many likes, comments or shares their posts receive.90 By effectively creating 
content, whether text, photo, audio, or video, which supports and maintains their unique 
personal brand, a micro-celebrity practitioner without any previous public profile can 
compete for attention and become famous to a niche population. 
In a 2012 article, Driessens called for more “analysing and comparing celebritization 
in different social fields.”91 The intense focus on cultural and political celebrities has enabled 
the development of a strong theoretical model, but it remains to be seen if this model is 
qualified in other social fields.92 What makes this practice particularly fruitful is that by 
nature, micro-celebrity practices are not static; techniques change depending on the digital 
                                                           
88 Khamis, Susie, Lawrence Ang, and Raymond Welling, “Self-branding, ‘micro-celebrity’ and the rise of 
Social Media Influencers,” Celebrity Studies 8, no. 2 (2017), 195. 
89 Senft, Camgirls, 26. 
90 Alice E. Marwick, “Instafame: Luxury Selfies in the Attention Economy,” Public Culture 27, no. 1 (2015), 
140. 
91 Driessens, “The celebritization of society,” 654. 
92 Ibid. 
Weil 26 
 
platform used and the social context of the user.93 Thus, studies in other arenas can illuminate 
different types of micro-celebrity and allow scholars to test whether the original model as 
proposed by Senft accounts for micro-celebrity practices in a wide range of social contexts.  
But why study celebrity at all? The field of celebrity studies, which stands as a 
subfield of media and culture studies, has struggled to gain legitimacy.94 Yet for all the 
claims that celebrity studies represents a “‘dumbing down’ of academia,” the field remains 
relevant for the simple reason that celebrity plays a large and ever-increasing role in 
society.95 “Entertainment is the primary standard of value for virtually everything in modern 
society”; entertainers, whatever their form, are mythologized and placed upon pedestals as 
varied as role model, mythic figure, and status symbol.96 As Rahman notes, “celebrity is a 
manifestation of globalized commodity consumerism.”97 In various manners, the public 
consumes celebrity, and that consumption creates demand for new celebrity personas. 
Gabler’s model of celebrity supply and demand helps explain the explosion of celebrity in 
the late twentieth and early twenty-first century precisely because the masses consuming 
celebrity wanted more.98 Celebrity culture seems to permeate all aspects of life today, and 
terrorism is no different. 
This study takes terrorists as the object of focus in order to understand how they fit 
the existing theoretical model and where terrorist celebrity differs. To take Jenkins’ metaphor 
of terrorism as theater, several questions remain: who are terrorism’s stars, how is their 
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celebrity constructed, and how are terrorist celebrities deploying that celebrity towards their 
political ends? And have the same forces of consumerism that have driven the expansion of 
mainstream celebrity also compelled a shift in terrorist celebrity? While celebrity has not 
been examined in depth by terrorism scholars, the above examination of the history of 
terrorism and the media and the history of celebrity demonstrates that they are by no means 
mutually exclusive. In fact, the same changes in media consumption and production have 
altered the functions of both terrorism and celebrity, most prominently the rise of digital 
communications platforms, which democratized both.  
Ultimately, while much scholarly attention has been paid to the many platforms that 
new media provides for terrorism, analyzing the process of celebritization goes a step further 
by combining the study of changing technology with an examination of shifting cultural 
behavior. This combination provides a more holistic understanding of the current changes in 
terrorism and the context in which they are taking place. The technological changes cannot 
be studied in isolation—to do so would ignore how societal and cultural trends feed into 
terrorist behavior. In bridging these discussions, this study examines how terrorist celebrity is 
built and maintained, how it has changed with the advent of digital micro-celebrity, what 
opportunities it has created for terrorist organizations, and the potential of celebrity to spread 
to more terrorist organizations. 
Outline 
This thesis is structured as follows. The second chapter takes the societal and 
technological trends identified in the literature review and examines how terrorist celebrity in 
particular has changed in parallel with shifts in mainstream celebrity culture. The chapter 
starts with terrorist celebrity and the old media, which largely mirrors traditional forms of 
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celebrity. It then examines the advent of martyrdom videos in the 1980s and 1990s, which is 
a period of transition from a broad celebrity to a more narrowly focused form. The chapter 
ends by analyzing how the internet changed the manifestation of both mainstream and 
terrorist celebrities, resulting in a targeted celebrity that can create a stronger sense of 
intimacy and provide more opportunities for strategic interaction. Throughout each of these 
stages, the different forms of terrorist celebrity are examined to see how each has contributed 
to terrorist organizations’ abilities to recruit operatives and carry out operations. 
Two case studies are analyzed of terrorists engaging in micro-celebrity. For analytic 
focus, only jihadists are examined. Further research will explore far right organizations, 
leftist groups, and single-issue terrorist organizations. The third chapter examines the first 
case study of Anwar al-Awlaki, the American-born AQAP cleric who became famous for his 
online sermons. The fourth chapter examines the second case study of Junaid Hussain, the 
British hacker turned Islamic State foreign fighter and virtual planner. The analytic focus is 
on celebrity production (how terrorist micro-celebrities create a personal brand), maintenance 
(how they keep up that brand), and outcomes (the opportunities the brand affords the 
terrorist). 
The conclusion summarizes the research findings on the effect of celebrity and 
analyzes the implications for terrorist recruitment and planning based on the case studies 
examined in chapters three and four. It then seeks to understand what will happen next in 
terrorist celebrity. Will these—and can these—micro-celebrity practices be exported to other 
terrorist groups or is this is unique to the Islamic State?  
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Chapter Two: A Brief History of Terrorist Celebrity 
This chapter analyzes how the manifestation of terrorist celebrity has changed from 
the mid-twentieth century to the present. While celebrity is an individual status, it can have a 
larger effect, particularly when the individual belongs to or represents a larger movement. 
Thus, the analytic focus is on how different types of celebrity contributed to terrorist 
organization’s abilities to recruit operatives and carry out operations. 
 As celebrity is an understudied aspect of terrorism studies, this chapter uses a media 
and culture studies lens to analyze the history of international terrorism and develop an 
original typology of terrorist celebrity (see figure 2.1, at the end of the chapter). Three types 
of terrorist celebrities are identified. First, traditional terrorist celebrity derives its status in 
the same way as traditional mainstream celebrity—through media coverage and public 
attention. These are typically terrorist leaders, especially charismatic operatives, or 
particularly elusive terrorists, all of whom capture the public’s attention and garner media 
coverage. Traditional terrorist celebrity status is broad: the individual in question is known 
both to their supporters and detractors and often acts accordingly. Second is the celebrity 
status achieved by suicide bombers who are labeled as martyrs. This celebrity status is 
unique is that it is bestowed posthumously to someone with little prior public profile. This 
creates a narrower celebrity that is targeted towards the local community in order to recruit 
rather than the public at large. Third is internet micro-celebrity, where terrorists treat 
followers as fans and engage in strategically intimate interactions online. This is the 
narrowest of the categories, as each micro-celebrity maintains a persona that appeals to a 
specific group of people online. 
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 These types are presented as evolutionary, but not completely distinct or separate. 
Evolutions in type occurred due to changes in technology, the media environment, and 
consumer demand for new celebrities, but the new types evolved alongside the former. For 
example, while traditional terrorist celebrity began in the 1960s and 70s and thus is very 
similar to the mainstream celebrity of that time, it still continues even as martyrdom and 
internet micro-celebrity are present today. 
While the focus of this study is on terrorist celebrity, it must be examined in the 
general context of celebritization in society as a whole, because this larger shift is what 
contributes to changes in terrorist celebrity. Terrorists have not suddenly created their own 
celebrities, but rather have engaged in and thus both deliberately and inadvertently 
weaponized the existing celebrity culture. Each of the three categories of terrorist celebrity 
will be contextualized within the mainstream celebrity equivalent and compared for 
similarities and differences. Finally, each category will be examined to determine how 
terrorist organizations create, maintain, and exploit celebrity status.  
Traditional Terrorist Celebrity 
 Celebrity terrorism in its original form is a direct outgrowth of the advent of 
international terrorism, which Hoffman posits began in 1968.99 With the growth of the 
mainstream media apparatus, terrorist acts were covered much more quickly and news 
reached a truly global audience. Just as media coverage of an attack is important for the 
terrorist organization to get out their message, it also has the effect of raising the profile of 
specific terrorists. Typically, these terrorist celebrities are charismatic group leaders or 
particularly elusive individuals who capture public attention through media coverage. One of 
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the first of these traditional terrorist celebrities was Ilich Ramírez Sánchez, more commonly 
known as Carlos the Jackal. 
 Carlos was a major figure in the 1970s and 80s. Effectively a terrorist freelancer, 
Carlos worked for actors as disparate as the People’s Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP), the Red Army Faction (RAF), the Japanese Red Army, and Libyan dictator 
Muammar Gaddafi. Yet even as he crisscrossed Europe, staging attacks and gaining media 
coverage, he was not arrested until the mid-1990s. This elusive nature, and Carlos’ 
involvement in some of the most high-profile attacks of the 1970s and 80s, made him into a 
terrorist celebrity. As Dobson described, Carlos became “a television show anti-hero 
translated into real life, a star on the world stage.”100 
Carlos recognized his newfound fame. During one of his most high-profile and 
brazen attacks, the December 1975 raid on the OPEC headquarters in Vienna, he introduced 
himself to an Iraqi negotiator thusly: “you will have heard of me already; I am the famous 
Carlos.”101 He used media coverage in order to bolster his public profile: during the OPEC 
attack, Carlos reportedly waited until television cameras arrived before leaving the building 
with hostages, in full view of a world audience.102 And Carlos tracked his media coverage, 
clipping and translating newspaper reports of his attacks because he believed that greater 
coverage made him seem more dangerous.103 Carlos’ celebrity status extended into mythical 
realms; after an attack in France in June 1975, attacks around the world were wrongly 
attributed to the newly famous and elusive terrorist.104 
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 This model—attacks begetting media coverage which create a public profile and 
persona for an individual terrorist—is that of the traditional terrorist celebrity. These 
terrorists are highly reliant on traditional media coverage to turn them into household names, 
and thus achieve celebrity status. Brigette Nacos is one of the only terrorism studies scholars 
to examine the concept of terrorist celebrity. In her study of the relationship between media 
and terrorism, Nacos examined how Timothy McVeigh reached celebrity status. McVeigh 
carried out the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, 
the deadliest terrorist attack on U.S. soil prior to 9/11. Nacos argues that it wasn’t just the 
media coverage of the sensational attack that turned McVeigh into a celebrity, but rather the 
media’s willingness to cover him as they would a mainstream celebrity from the world of 
entertainment or sports. For example, Newsweek magazine ran an interview with McVeigh 
and placed a photo of him “staring dreamily into space” on the cover of the issue.105 In that 
sense, McVeigh “received the kind of glamour treatment from Newsweek magazine that was 
usually only accorded movie stars.”106 McVeigh was even one of Time magazine’s runners-
up for man of the year in 1995.107 
Every major American news outlet wanted to interview McVeigh, allowing him to 
reach an even higher level of celebrity than the publicity his attack provided. By Nacos’ 
calculation, in the last half-year of his life, McVeigh received more coverage than Vice 
President Dick Cheney, and McVeigh received a third of the mentions of President George 
W. Bush in the news.108 A victim’s family member told reporter Katie Couric that the bomber 
                                                           
105 Neal Gabler, Life the Movie, 181. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Lou Michel and Dan Herbeck, American Terrorist: Timothy McVeigh & The Oklahoma City Bombing (New 
York: ReganBooks, 2001), 298. 
108 Nacos, Mass-mediated Terrorism, 102. 
Weil 33 
 
“made himself a name” through his appearances on television.109 Once this public profile was 
created, McVeigh began receiving love letters and marriage proposals from as far afield as 
Germany and Ireland.110 Ted Kaczynski, the notorious Unabomber, also received similar 
treatment by the media upon his capture: TIME magazine ran an interview with him, and 
outlets all over the United States, including major programs such as Good Morning American 
and the Today Show and even regional papers such as The Denver Post clamored to get 
interview access, but Kaczynski was not forthcoming.111 Katie Couric personally wrote 
Kaczynski to request an interview, mentioning her “huge audience” as an incentive.112 
 One final case is illustrative: Osama bin Laden, the deceased former leader of Al 
Qaeda and arguably the most well-known terrorist of all time. Bin Laden was keenly aware 
of the importance of media relations. After his declaration of war against the United States, 
he gave several interviews to news outlets, which helped to start building a public profile. In 
1997, bin Laden specifically chose CNN to give his first broadcast interview targeted 
towards a Western audience.113 He finished that interview with a summary of his approach to 
media and terrorism: “when asked about his future plans bin Laden had replied: “‘You’ll see 
them and hear about them in the media, God willing.’”114 He consciously used terrorist 
attacks to spread his message and build a profile for his organization, but also became a 
celebrity in the process. According to Nacos’ calculations, NBC and CBS coverage in 2000 
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of bin Laden far outweighed that referring to allied leaders Tony Blair and Gerhard 
Schroeder.115 
 Indeed, even though bin Laden had given several interviews in the 1990s, it was the 
spectacle of Al Qaeda’s attack on 9/11 that elevated bin Laden to new celebrity heights. After 
the attacks, the American public in particular had a desire to learn more about the mysterious 
terrorist leader. At that point, granting interviews to Western journalists became too risky and 
bin Laden released a steady stream of video and audio statements from hiding, speaking both 
to friends and foes and maintaining his terrorist celebrity status.  
Celebrity production and maintenance 
 In summary, traditional terrorist celebrities are typically a charismatic leader, an 
especially elusive individual, and/or a terrorist who carries out a spectacular attack. A leader 
could be a celebrity because they are a stand-in for the organization, or because they give 
interviews on behalf of the group. An elusive terrorist might garner fame by frequently 
escaping capture and thus continually gaining media coverage. And a successful terrorist 
could become a celebrity through high levels of media coverage, and in particular, as noted 
in the Timothy McVeigh case, a certain type of treatment by the news media. 
But terrorists have historically needed interviews or profiles run about them in order 
to become a more well-known public figure. Traditional terrorist celebrities are thus 
dependent on external media, and their celebrity is produced through media coverage and 
strategic public appearances. However, terrorists can also take celebrity production into their 
own hands by selectively granting interviews to media organizations. In the case of bin 
Laden, the Taliban banned him from giving interviews in 1999. In order to maintain his 
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celebrity status and push his message to the world, he began taping his statements and 
sending them to media outlets, most frequently Al Jazeera, for distribution to the world.116 
One Guantanamo detainee expertly described this process of traditional terrorist 
celebrity production before a military tribunal: 
“Detainee: I knew Osama bin Laden for a long time. When I met him, he was 
not famous…When the Russians attacked Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden was 
like anyone else. After the Gulf War, he became famous. Who made him 
famous? Do you know who made him famous?  
Tribunal President: You tell me. 
Detainee: I will tell you: America. By the media and television and by 
magazines. Everybody is talking about Osama Bin Laden. Through the media, 
you made him famous. In the seventies, it was Carlos [“The Jackal,” a 
notorious terrorist]. Today, it is Osama bin Laden.”117 
However, this dependence on external media means that there is limited ability to control 
how one is presented. Terrorists can certainly try to influence how they are presented, 
particularly by granting interviews. For example, in accepting an interview, Timothy 
McVeigh’s lawyer hoped to “present our client to the public as we believe he really is.”118 
 Traditional terrorist celebrities, dependent on the mainstream media, face an audience 
of both potential supporters and adversaries. The scope is broad because the coverage reaches 
a wide audience. Bin Laden in particular targeted his taped speeches towards both followers 
and those he wished to fight.  
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 The dependence on external media also leads to limited opportunities for recruitment 
and planning because there are few options for strategic interaction between the celebrity and 
potential recruit. Take the case of the RAF in West Germany in the 1970s. The group’s 
leaders, Andreas Baader and Gudrun Ensslin, became famous amongst young left-wing 
Germans for their act of arson in 1968 and subsequent courtroom antics during their trial. 
However, they were not able to operationalize that celebrity because they only reached their 
audience through media coverage. That was until the pair was required by the court to 
conduct social work with juvenile delinquents. Baader and Ensslin first recruited for their 
terrorist organization during that social work; it gave them the opportunity to engage in 
strategic interaction with fans and make use of their celebrity status.119 
 One subcategory of this type is a celebrity who chooses to become a terrorist. This 
involves someone with a pre-existing public profile, typically achieved in the traditional 
manner of producing celebrity, transitioning to the realm of terrorism and bringing their 
celebrity status along. An early example is Ulrike Meinhof, who gained acclaim as a left-
wing columnist before joining the first generation of the RAF. In May 1961, she wrote a 
column for leftist publication konkret comparing Franz Josef Strauss, the Christian Social 
Democrat’s chairman, to Hitler.120 Strauss sued and the trial resulted in Meinhof becoming a 
“household name throughout West Germany.”121 When she again targeted Strauss in a 
November 1964 column, she was called “courageous” by popular news magazine Der 
Spiegel, which also published a photo of Meinhof, putting a face to the name and greatly 
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increasing the public’s knowledge of the columnist.122 Meinhof gained her celebrity through 
traditional means in a mainstream environment of the news media and intelligentsia, and then 
transferred that celebrity status to her involvement in terrorist activities. In Meinhof’s case, 
she continued to maintain her terrorist celebrity status in a traditional manner: through media 
coverage of her statements and the RAF’s attacks. This is perhaps epitomized by the term 
“Baader-Meinhof Gang,” which was used by the media and government to refer to the 
organization rather than the group’s self-proclaimed title, the Rote Armee Fraktion. 
More recent examples include famous Europeans who traveled to Syria to join the 
Islamic State. Denis Cuspert was a Berlin native who began a rap career in 2002 under the 
name “Deso Dogg.”123 He had opened for American rapper DMX and contributed music to a 
movie soundtrack.124 However, after a car crash in 2010, Cuspert gave up rapping and 
converted to Islam.125 He took up the kunya “Abu Talha al-Almani,” and joined the Islamic 
State in 2014.126 The Islamic State made full use of Cuspert’s status by featuring him in many 
videos, the most notorious of which included Cuspert holding a severed head. Commenting 
on the Islamic State’s usage of Cuspert, a spokesperson for the German domestic security 
agency called Cuspert “a pop star of jihad.”127 This also made him a target: in January 2018, 
a pro-Islamic State media group reported that Cuspert had been killed in Syria.128 Cuspert 
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gained his celebrity through traditional means, just as Meinhof had done fifty years prior. 
However, he maintained his celebrity terrorist status through the practice of online micro-
celebrity, a process which will be examined later through in-depth case studies.  
In comparison to mainstream celebrity 
 Traditional terrorist celebrity is highly similar to mainstream celebrities who are also 
reliant on various forms of mass media to increase their visibility and status. Indeed, as 
Nacos argues, it was the same culture of a media obsessed with celebrity coverage that lead 
to the “infotainment” manner of covering McVeigh in the same light as a traditional star.129 
In both cases, traditional terrorist and mainstream celebrities hope that media outlets cover 
them in order for the public to know them, and engage in interviews and other appearances to 
build up that public profile. 
Another parallel is the celebrity status of criminals. In 1975, artist Andy Warhol 
wrote “if you’re a crook you’re still considered up-there. You can write books, go on TV, 
give interviews —you’re a big celebrity and nobody even looks down on you because you’re 
a crook.”130 Warhol had seen criminals like Lee Harvey Oswald become household names, 
and keenly understood that they had an incentive to take advantage of the free media 
coverage, particularly as a ladder to fame. Indeed, Lankford’s study of mass killers showed 
that after an attack the killers received “more coverage than professional athletes and only 
slightly less than television and film stars.”131 In the same manner as Nacos’ study on media 
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coverage of terrorists, mass killers can earn celebrity status through public acts of violence. 
Traditional terrorist celebrities have followed the same path to fame. 
Celebrity and Martyrdom 
The next type of terrorist celebrity is martyrdom, or posthumous celebrity status. This 
status is derived from the act of suicide terrorism, and is bestowed upon the individual by the 
terrorist organization and the local community once the attack is complete. For terrorist 
celebrity, the advent of martyrdom videos represents a period of transition from a broad 
celebrity to a more narrowly focused form. Whereas traditional terrorist celebrity relied on 
mass media to create more widespread public knowledge of the individual terrorist in 
question, martyrdom was a classification of celebrity targeted specifically at a local 
community, not the public at large.  
 Suicide bombing first entered the international terrorist’s repertoire in the final two 
decades of the 20th century. The tactic originated in early 1980s Lebanon, when Hezbollah 
began using suicide bombers to strike Israeli and American targets.132 The Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) then took up the tactic in their insurgent campaign in Sri Lanka 
starting in 1987.133 In the 1990s, a constellation of Palestinian groups in Israel and the 
Occupied Territories began employing suicide bombings as well, with a particular focus on 
transportation and civilian targets.134 The tactic became increasingly common in the 21st 
century: Pape and Feldman counted only 350 suicide attacks from 1980 to 2003, but found 
1,833 between 2004 and 2009.135 Moghadam has shown that the tactic has not only increased 
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in frequency, but also diffused globally to locations as disparate as Britain, Uzbekistan, and 
Iraq.136  
Individuals willingly turn to suicide terrorism for various reasons.137 Pape’s primary 
argument is that nationalism motivates suicide terrorists, who wish to use the tactic to rid 
their country of a foreign occupying force.138 The underlying motivation is altruism, because 
a deep connection to one’s community will drive them to sacrifice themselves.139 Other 
motivating factors for an individual include a sense of injustice, personal loss, and a desire 
for religious purity (if a religious frame is used to mobilize the bombers).140 However, there 
is an additional motivating factor that is particularly salient for the study at hand: the 
incentive of celebrity status.  
Individuals are often drawn to suicide bombing for the promise that in death they can 
achieve fame. This is a distinct form of terrorist celebrity status: the martyr. That title is 
deliberately used by terrorist organizations to describe dead suicide terrorists; a martyr is one 
who has sacrificed themselves for a cause and is in turn venerated for their act. For a 
potential bomber, suicide terrorism is “a way of becoming a hero and part of an exalted 
elite.”141 This search for fame can be the sole motivator or can be combined with another, 
such as an altruistic desire to help one’s community. As Crenshaw notes, “the act is not just 
about dying and killing. The expectation of gaining status and respect as a martyr for the 
cause is important, so the individual action is linked to anticipation of both popular approval 
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and collective political success.”142 In this manner, the act of suicide bombing and the 
celebrity it bestows offers an “opportunity to impress a wider audience and be 
remembered.”143  
With the diffusion of suicide bombing as a tactic came the rise of martyrdom videos. 
A martyrdom video is a film created to be released after the suicide bomber completes their 
mission. The videos typically feature solely the bomber speaking directly to the camera. A 
martyrdom video is a way for the terrorist to share their personal narrative and motivation for 
committing the attack. It frequently involves the bomber introducing themselves, explaining 
why they chose to attack, listing perceived or real grievances against the enemy, and offering 
religious rationale for the action. 
The systematic production and dissemination of martyrdom videos began with the 
First and Second Chechen Wars (1994-1996 and 1999-2009, respectively), and was 
continued by Palestinian groups in the Second Intifada in 2000.144 The Iraq War saw a large 
increase in martyrdom videos, and they have since become standard practice for suicide 
bombers in the global Salafi jihadist movement.145 These martyrdom videos became the 
primary means through which suicide terrorist celebrity was created and maintained because 
they can be easily distributed and focus solely on the individual in question. If the task of 
creating celebrity is to increase visibility and individuality, then a martyrdom video for each 
suicide bomber provides a clear method of achieving posthumous celebrity status in the local 
community. 
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 Similar to traditional terrorist celebrities, martyrs and martyrdom videos technically 
have two audiences. One is external: namely, the target audience the terrorist wishes to 
intimidate. Mohammad Sidique Khan, the ringleader of the cell that attacked London public 
transport on July 7, 2005 focused the almost the entirety of his martyrdom video on the 
external audience. Khan repeatedly threatened civilians in Western countries, whom he found 
culpable: 
“Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities 
against my people all over the world. And your support of them makes you 
directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and 
avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters. Until we feel security, you will be 
our targets. And until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and 
torture of my people we will not stop this fight.”146 
While these videos are sometimes used to threaten the opponent, in contrast to traditional 
celebrity, the overwhelming focus of the operationalization of martyrdom status through 
videos is on the internal audience. One of the primary purposes of martyrdom videos is to 
recruit new bombers to the terrorist organization. Once a video is created and circulated, the 
dead bomber becomes a known individual in their community. This martyrdom status is in 
turn used by terrorist organizations as a recruitment tool. As Nauta notes, a martyr needs an 
audience, because it is only through their recognition that the deceased will live on in the 
collective memory of the community.147 By idolizing the dead bomber and creating a small 
celebrity out of them, the organization increases the incentives for potential recruits to sign 
on.  
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 Take for example the case of Hezbollah, the Shi’ite militia and political party based 
in southern Lebanon. While Hezbollah was the first terrorist group to adopt a campaign of 
suicide terror, the organization initially did not claim attacks or reveal the identity of the 
bombers for fear of government retaliation.148 However, in May of 1985, the group used its 
weekly newspaper to claim credit for the November 1982 bombing of an Israeli military 
installation and reveal the identity of the bomber, fifteen-year-old Ahmad Qasir.149 Not only 
did Hezbollah take credit for the attack that occurred three years earlier, but in December 
1985, they placed posters of Qasir’s face throughout his home village of Dayr Qanun al-
Nahr.150 This marked the start of a new practice of publicly glorifying dead suicide bombers 
as martyrs. And it worked—an Associated Press report quoted local residents describing 
Qasir as “brave,” and a “hero” who lived on “in our hearts.”151 As Pedahzur describes, Qasir 
became a “mega-celebrity in both Lebanon and Iran” once propaganda efforts celebrating 
Qasir spread, including large posters of the teenager placed on roadsides throughout southern 
Lebanon, not just in his home village.152 
Hezbollah then mastered a highly efficient martyr production process. In order to 
incentivize potential bombers, the organization provides financial support to the individual’s 
family after the bomber’s death.153 Most importantly for celebrity, Hezbollah creates a 
revered status for suicide bombers through parades and tributes. A massive Martyr’s Day 
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celebration is held every year on November 11 in honor of Qasir, Hezbollah’s first suicide 
bomber, and all bombers since.154 While less than 20 percent of ordinary suicide cases 
involve a note, Pape found that the majority of Hezbollah suicide bombers left behind 
martyrdom statements, in either video or writing.155 These narratives are then disseminated in 
the local community.156 All of this posthumously increases the status of the martyr, 
increasing their celebrity profile in the local community and creating strong social incentives 
for potential recruits to sign up to be the next martyr and achieve celebrity status.157 
 Another case is Al Qaeda, the perpetrator of the most high-profile suicide attack in 
history: the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center. The organization’s adoption 
of martyrdom videos epitomizes the celebrification aspect of the process. Al Qaeda did not 
initially use martyrdom videos until member Abu Huthayfa wrote a memo extolling the 
benefits of the tactic in June of 2000.158 Impressed by Hamas’ practice of using martyrdom 
videos as a publicity and recruitment tool, he saw an opportunity for Al Qaeda as well.159 In 
particular, Huthayfa was disappointed that the world was “unaware of the heroes” who had 
carried out Al Qaeda’s 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa.160 In order to remedy this 
situation, Huthayfa explained his rationale for Al Qaeda using martyrdom videos, writing 
that: 
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“[Martyrdom] operations should be utilized to rally many mujahidin to join 
the 
Movement. A martyrdom operation executed by men from the Peninsula has a 
great stimulating psychological effects on hundreds of mujahidin from inside 
to practice this experiment and acquire martyrdom. In fact, one of them 
opened the door for this effort. How nice it would be if in the future the 
executor of an operation is videotaped while he is giving an inciting speech to 
the nation and then his speech is published after the operation is carried out 
successfully similar to what HAMAS is doing. The opportunity is still there to 
bridge the informational and political gap via publishing the wills of these 
martyrs, to follow their steps and to rely on their magnificent 
accomplishments and their ability to break the psychological apprehension 
whereby they will be introducing this experiment to the people in the 
Peninsula.”161  
Huthayfa’s explanation clearly highlights the use of martyrdom videos to recruit new 
bombers, thus creating and operationalizing the celebrity status of each bomber. After this, 
Al Qaeda pivoted and became the world leader in martyrdom videos by using its two media 
branches, The Global Islamic Media Front and Al-Sahab Productions, to produce 
professional videos.162 
 Both Hezbollah, the first adopter of suicide campaigns, and Al Qaeda, a later 
implementer, did not initially employ propaganda that highlighted individual bombers. Both 
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terrorist groups turned to bomber statements and public glorification in order to create a 
culture of martyrdom celebrity that could increase recruitment and public support. In the case 
of Al Qaeda, it was the success of martyrdom celebrity in earlier campaigns that convinced 
the organization to begin using the tactic after bombings. 
Celebrity production and maintenance 
 In summary, martyrdom celebrity status is circular: terrorist organizations create high 
profiles for previous bombers and use their narratives to incentivize potential recruits to join 
the ranks. The terrorist organization is instrumental in the production of martyr celebrity 
status; while the individual commits the attack, the organization is responsible for 
disseminating statements and creating a culture in which bombers are honored with parades, 
posters, and memorials. Ultimately, as Pape argues, it is then up to the local community to 
decide whether or not to accept the individual as a martyr.163 If the community deems them 
worthy, then they bestow upon the individual a posthumous celebrity status of martyr and 
enshrine the status in collective memory by participating in yearly celebrations or agreeing to 
put up memorials. 
 However, one distinct difference from other forms of celebrity is that the construction 
of martyrdom celebrity relied on the operative being dead. Even more distinct is that almost 
none of these bombers were famous beforehand, but were made famous after they died in 
order to increase recruitment in target communities. Thus, terrorist organizations were using 
the tools at hand—video recording—to create local celebrities from previously unknown 
individuals. Importantly, this celebrity is targeted; rather than a broad-based celebrity such as 
traditional celebrity status, suicide bomber martyrdom is a status that largely only applies to 
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the local community. After death, a previously unknown individual is marketed to the 
community for their sacrifice and becomes well-known within that area, but not in the world 
at large. In order to produce these celebrity martyrs, terrorist groups were initially dependent 
on TV networks to air clips of martyrdom statements. However, with advances in online 
video hosting, groups began posting the videos directly online, which is the standard practice 
today. 
  Once this posthumous celebrity profile is created, terrorist organizations maintain the 
status through public memorials and the continued dissemination of martyrdom statements. 
Some suicide bombers have gained strong followings through their celebrity status. Wafa 
Idris and Hawa Barayev, the first Palestinian and Chechen female suicide bombers, 
respectively, each gained celebrity status in the local community: both inspired future female 
bombers, with Idris becoming a “cult heroine” and Chechen insurgents writing songs in 
Barayev’s honor.164 This celebrity status is then operationalized by terrorist organizations 
with the goal of recruiting more bombers.  
In contrast to the strict dependence on external media in traditional terrorist celebrity, 
the organization-driven creation of martyrdom means that terrorist groups have much more 
leeway in how they create a martyr. The terrorist organization gets full creative license in 
crafting the narrative for the martyr, whereas traditional terrorist celebrities must try to 
manage a celebrity profile that is largely in the hands of the mainstream media. However, 
one similarity between traditional terrorist celebrity and martyrdom celebrity is the primacy 
of the terrorist attack. In the former, media coverage of an attack is crucial to gain celebrity 
status and in the latter, an individual must be associated with a completed suicide bombing in 
                                                           
164 Bloom, Dying to Kill, 148, 154. 
Weil 48 
 
order to be recognized as a martyr. The mechanisms of celebrity production are different, but 
the attack itself is still at the heart of that celebrity status. 
In comparison to mainstream celebrity 
 Unlike traditional terrorist celebrity status, there is no clear parallel to mainstream 
celebrity. As martyrs are originally individuals without a public profile, they are not created 
in the same manner as mainstream celebrities. Typically, in order to retain celebrity status 
after death, an individual must have been a celebrity while alive. Death can certainly increase 
one’s level of fame, particularly in the art world. Rappers Tupac Shakur and Biggie Smalls 
both gained increased followings and enshrined status as two of the best rappers of all time, 
in no small part through a combined nine posthumous album releases since their respective 
deaths in 1996 and 1997. However, both had a public profile beforehand that was built on in 
death. Terrorist martyrs stand in stark contrast as they are completely unknown during their 
lifetimes and are transformed into celebrities only after death. Another key difference is the 
size of celebrity status. In mainstream celebrity, those who retain fame in death are typically 
famous enough to be known to a wide swath of people. With terrorist martyrs, however, the 
goal is only to make the individual a celebrity in the local community, capping how broadly 
the individual is known. With this type of terrorist celebrity, it appears that terrorist 
organizations succeeded in creating their own specific form of celebrity, separate from the 
cultural trends and machinations that drive celebrity in the world at large.  
 One important similarity is that martyrdom videos acted as a phase of transition 
between types of celebrities, and their origins in the 1990s and 2000s parallel a similar 
transition in mainstream celebrity. The rise of reality television involved entertainment 
companies elevating previously unknown individuals, albeit alive throughout the whole 
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process, to some level of stardom by appearing on television programs.165 Moreover, just as 
martyrdom marks a transition from a broad form of celebrity to a community-focused, 
narrowly-targeted form, so too does reality television. While previous television stars 
appealed to a wide swath of the public, reality television stars were famous in smaller circles: 
a show about home repairs or restaurant overhauls appeals to a subsection of the public with 
those interests, while competition shows such as Survivor have more widespread appeal. In 
both cases it is the organization, the terrorist group or media company that both creates the 
celebrity status of the individual and also benefits from that status.166  
Early Internet Micro-Celebrity 
The early 2000s saw the emergence of a distinct type of terrorist celebrity. The 
internet and new media provided different opportunities for terrorists and sympathizers to 
build a brand online and connect with followers. This could be done without the aid of 
mainstream media, in contrast to the dependence of the traditional type of terrorist celebrity. 
These individuals practiced “micro-celebrity” by producing content with a specific brand and 
cultivating a following.  
 One of the first cases of a terrorist internet micro-celebrity was Sheikh Terra and the 
Soul Salah Crew. A group of pro-Al Qaeda British rappers, the group released a music video 
in February 2004 for a song called “Dirty Kuffar” (kuffar refers to non-believers, in 
Arabic).167 The song, in English, is rapped in the style of reggae hip-hop, and focuses on 
criticizing both American and Western leaders (most prominently President George W. Bush 
and Prime Minister Tony Blair), as well as Muslim leaders Pervez Musharraf and Hosni 
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Mubarak, whom the rappers imply are traitors to Islam by calling them kuffar as well. Dirty 
Kuffar features rappers in black hoodies brandishing guns and the Quran, and rapping in 
front of a black flag. The song ends with the rappers laughing while footage of the World 
Trade Center collapsing plays, followed by a scrolling list of countries that is titled: “victims 
of US violence since 1945.”  
Since Dirty Kuffar’s release, the video “has been downloaded onto millions of 
computers and remixed by many like-minded web jihadists.”168 The video also inspired a 
series of follow-ons and copycats. As Gartenstein-Ross notes, after Dirty Kuffar’s release, 
“there has been a definable trend toward jihadi rap music,” which combines popular music 
styles with anti-American sentiment in order to win support for the transnational Salafi 
jihadist cause.169 While Dirty Kuffar provides a strong example of self-produced media and 
personal brand building, the music video was a one-off event. The group did not continue 
with more music, and gained fame from only the one video. Neither Sheik Terra nor the rest 
of the group appear to have engaged with fans, thus missing a key element of micro-
celebrity. Thus, this case demonstrated the early potential of the concept of a terrorist micro-
celebrity, which would be built on in the coming years. 
 A second example highlights the way in which terrorist micro-celebrities engage with 
followers online. Perhaps the first internet terrorist micro-celebrity practitioner was a man 
who went by the screen name “Irhabi007.” The screen name translates to “terrorist 007,” 
after the famous fictional British spy James Bond’s code name.170 Irhabi007 was in fact 
Younes Tsouli, a young Moroccan-born man who had been brought to live in London with 
                                                           
168 El Akkad, “Terror goes digital”. 
169 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Jihadi Rap,” Front Page Magazine, November 1, 2004, 
http://archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=10635.  
170 Kohlmann, ““Homegrown” Terrorists,” 103. 
Weil 51 
 
his father in 2001.171 Tsouli studied information technology in college after arriving in the 
UK.172 Accounts point to the US invasion of Iraq and the subsequent insurgency as having a 
particularly radicalizing effect on Tsouli.173 Tsouli initially viewed images of U.S. forces in 
Iraq on jihadist internet chat rooms, and then became a frequent poster. Soon he was 
moderating and then running jihadist websites where supporters around the world shared 
propaganda.174 Tsouli’s obsession with the Iraq War continued, and his internet presence 
allowed him to begin contact with members of Al Qaeda in Iraq. He acted as an internet host 
and facilitator for AQI, providing them with new sites to spread material and different 
download locations for files.175  Due to his role as the go-to man for file hosting, Tsouli 
“earned virtual celebrity status on extremist Web forums by his adroit use of new media 
platforms to distribute jihadist propaganda.”176  
In Irhabi007’s case, he built a personal brand around his reputation as a skilled 
hacker. His exploits included hacking into and storing files on servers running the websites 
of George Washington University and the Arkansas State Highway and Transportation 
Department.177 At the moment of his arrest, Tsouli was even creating a jihadist video-hosting 
website titled “Youbombit.com” as an alternative to YouTube, demonstrating his effort to 
create a new medium for his micro-celebrity practice.178 These exploits made him famous in 
two communities. First, he gained fame amongst actual jihadists in Iraq, who became 
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increasingly grateful to and dependent on Tsouli for file and forum hosting online. At one 
point a high-ranking AQI member approached Tsouli for help producing an electronic 
magazine.179 Second, he became well known amongst jihadist sympathizers and those who 
wished to travel to Iraq to join AQI, as his forum was a primary point of contact. Analysts 
have described Tsouli’s role for this second audience as a “matchmaker,” linking potential 
recruits with actual members of AQI.180 In one case, he helped broker contact between a 
Moroccan recruit who had traveled to Syria and AQI.181 Tsouli also trained other online 
jihadist sympathizers in operational security by teaching them how to remain anonymous and 
thus avoid capture; at one point, he shared a twenty-page guide to hacking websites on a 
forum so that others could also secretly host files on others’ servers.182 This reputation earned 
him a virtual celebrity status among his peers: one analyst labeled him “the undisputed king 
of internet terrorism.”183 Ultimately, Tsouli’s operational security slipped when he used a cell 
phone to contact another AQI supporter in Eastern Europe; when that cell was raided, the call 
logs gave away Tsouli’s location.184 Tsouli, then twenty-two years old, was arrested in a 
West London basement in October 2005.185 
Celebrity production and maintenance 
Early terrorist internet celebrities were often anonymous or pseudonymous. They 
were known only by their screen names. Additionally, the internet served as a democratizing 
force. Neither Sheik Terra nor Irhabi007 were members of a terrorist group, but new digital 
tools allowed sympathizers worldwide to get involved in their own ways. No longer did a 
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terrorist celebrity have to belong to a terrorist organization. In Irhabi007’s case, he used his 
internet celebrity as leverage to establish actual connections with AQI without ever leaving 
London.  
In stark contrast to other types of terrorist celebrity, the internet celebrity doesn’t have 
to be involved in an attack. As seen in the cases, one can gain a following online merely 
through posting. Real acts may increase credibility, but some terrorist micro-celebrities, as in 
both cases highlighted above, are just sympathizers who have never committed violent acts. 
The ability to self-produce and publish online allowed them to become small celebrities. 
 What is clearest about terrorist internet celebrity is that it involves the deliberate 
cultivation of a personal brand, designed to appeal to a specific consumer. In the case of 
Dirty Kuffar, the brand was reggae and hip-hop. Through the music style and a video which 
emulated that culture, the rappers hoped to appeal to young Muslims living in the West who 
listened to hip-hop, harbored similar sentiments and thus would be drawn to the song. This is 
a style that would not appeal to all jihadist sympathizers. Many would likely disavow the 
video because it is not permitted under their strict guidelines. However, Sheik Terra and the 
Soul Salah Crew were expanding the pool of potential sympathizers by making jihad “cool” 
and engaging with the target population, young Muslim males in Western countries, in a 
language familiar from popular culture: “hypermasculine rage, defiance, and gunplay.”186 
This “reggae/rap hybrid style in the mold of popular artist Sean Paul” would appeal to young 
potential sympathizers in a way that, for example, Bin Laden’s video lectures might not.187 
By building a personal brand meant to appeal to a specific consumer base, internet terrorist 
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celebrities deliberately target those with whom they want recognition. While it’s narrower, 
it’s also more potent because there are more frequent opportunities for strategic interaction 
and the creation of intimacy between the fan and the individual practicing micro-celebrity. 
Irhabi007 was able to connect prospective terrorists from around the world with the actual 
organization of AQI, thus engaging with his followers in a manner not seen previously.  
In comparison to mainstream celebrity 
 These cases are highly similar to mainstream micro-celebrity. In particular, both cases 
appeal to a narrow audience who connect with the material. Just as Sheik Terra and Irhabi007 
gained fame by creating and posting their own content online, so too do mainstream micro-
celebrity practitioners on YouTube, for example. The actions of Tsouli in particular match 
with Senft’s seminal study of micro-celebrity. In her examination of camgirls, Senft 
demonstrated how each was creating their own persona and sharing it with the world, often 
by broadcasting their daily lives. In similar fashion, Tsouli not only created a persona that 
appealed to both AQI leadership and potential recruits, but was also known for being “online 
day and night, ready to answer questions about how to post a video.”188 Tsouli was accessible 
and relatable to his target audience in just the same manner as the camgirls studied by Senft. 
Conclusion 
As far as the typology of terrorist celebrity, these two cases fall neatly within micro-
celebrity. However, in the decade since Sheik Terra and Irhabi007, hybridizations have 
occurred: namely, those who practiced micro-celebrity but also became famous in wider 
circles through mainstream media coverage. Some even became martyrs. In particular, the 
manifestation of internet terrorist celebrity has been affected by the rise of social media. 
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Social media platforms were still in their infancy at the time of Sheik Terra and Irhabi007. 
The rise of social media has affected not only mainstream celebrities, but also the demand for 
and production of terrorist micro-celebrities. The next two chapters will examine case studies 
of these hybrid terrorist celebrities in order to understand how terrorist celebrity manifests 
itself in the contemporary age, and the implications of those changes. 
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Figure 2.1: An Evolutionary Typology of Terrorist Celebrity 
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Chapter Three: Sheikh Anwar 
 Anwar al Awlaki is perhaps the most famous terrorist internet micro-celebrity of all 
time. The American-born imam built a reputation for himself within the western Muslim 
community through his lectures and sermons. Moreover, Awlaki entered the transnational 
Salafi jihad scene just as social media platforms were coming of age, and he used platforms 
such as Facebook, YouTube, and a blog to his full advantage. Awlaki thus represents a strong 
micro-celebrity practitioner, but also someone who was a hybridization of all terrorist 
celebrity types. He gained traditional media coverage, built his own profile through online 
postings, and was venerated after his death. This chapter examines his nature as a traditional 
celebrity, as a practitioner of micro-celebrity, and as a martyr. A particular focus is placed on 
Awlaki’s personal branding and the persona he presented to followers around the world. 
Case Study Background 
Anwar al Awlaki was born in 1971 in New Mexico while his father was studying as a 
Fulbright Scholar.189 Awlaki grew up in the U.S. until he was seven and then returned with 
his Yemeni parents to their homeland in 1978.190 In, 1991, Awlaki traveled to the U.S. to start 
an engineering degree at Colorado State University in Fort Collins, Colorado.191 Awlaki had 
not been particularly devout as child. In a telling example, he repeatedly removed a prayer 
rug that his mother placed in his luggage for college, telling her it wasn’t necessary in the 
U.S.192 Yet it was his time in the U.S. that would change his mind. Awlaki behaved like most 
American college students during his first semester, but his Saudi roommate noticed a change 
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after winter break in academic year 1990-1991. Awlaki had been spending time with 
members of the proselytizing group Tablighi Jamaat and the start of U.S. airstrikes on 
Baghdad in particular struck a nerve with him.193 One year later, he spent his winter break 
traveling to Afghanistan to see the battleground of the mujahedeen for himself.194  
While in college, Awlaki began delivering sermons at the Fort Collins Islamic 
Center.195 Upon graduation, he took his father’s advice and accepted an entry-level 
engineering job in Denver, but also chose to take a part-time job as an imam.196 This would 
be the start of eight years of preaching in the U.S., even though Awlaki had never formally 
studied Islamic theology. Awlaki served as an imam at mosques across the U.S., going from 
Denver to a position in San Diego, and then finally to Falls Church, Virginia at a large 
mosque just outside of Washington, D.C.197 On September 11th, he was an imam in Virginia 
and after the attacks was often asked to explain Islam to non-Muslims, including during a 
webcast hosted by the Washington Post and a prayer breakfast at the Pentagon.198 Awlaki 
was initially a fairly moderate preacher. He criticized Al Qaeda after September 11th for their 
decision to carry out the attack.199 By that time, Awlaki had developed a well-known profile 
as an imam, and in 2002 he was asked to lead the first Muslim prayer to occur at the U.S. 
Capitol.200 
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 However, Awlaki had also attracted the attention of federal authorities. Two 9/11 
hijackers had prayed at Awlaki’s mosque in San Diego.201 While it was concluded that 
Awlaki did not have a substantive connection to the bombers or the plot, the FBI did discover 
and document Awlaki’s frequent solicitation of escorts.202 Upon learning that the FBI had a 
file of information that could ruin his public career, Awlaki fled to the United Kingdom in 
March of 2002.203 After briefly preaching in the U.K., Awlaki returned to Yemen in 2004.  
 Awlaki was then arrested in Yemen on August 21, 2006 on charges of kidnapping a 
teenager and involvement in a separate Al Qaeda kidnapping plot targeting a U.S. official.204 
He was released in December 2007 for a lack of evidence.205 Following his release, Awlaki 
moved to the family home in Saeed, a town in the Shabwa Mountains.206 It was at this time 
that Awlaki’s statements became more openly militant, and he began making more public 
calls for violence.207 These included his December 2008 letter of support for al-Shabaab, the 
terrorist group in Somalia.208  
In January 2009, Al Qaeda announced a new affiliate in Yemen called Al Qaeda in 
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Shortly thereafter, Awlaki moved further into the Shabwa 
Mountains to an area near the group’s training camp.209 In late 2009, U.S. Director of 
National Intelligence James Clapper stated that Awlaki had pledged allegiance to the group’s 
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leader, Nasir al-Wuhaishi.210 In May 2010, Wuhaishi confirmed the link when he released an 
audio statement claiming Awlaki as one of their own.211 
Yet it was two events in late 2009 that would put Awlaki under intense scrutiny from 
American counterterrorism authorities. First was the November 5th shooting at Fort Hood by 
Nidal Hasan, an Army doctor who had conversed with Awlaki over email, although Awlaki 
did not discuss operational details or give express permission. Awlaki later released public 
statements celebrating the attack and calling Hasan a hero. The second event was the failed 
Christmas Day attack by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who attempted to detonate an 
explosive device hidden in his underwear as the plane he was aboard was landing in Detroit. 
The young Nigerian had traveled to Yemen and received direct training and instructions from 
Awlaki.212 After a series of internal deliberations, the Obama administration placed Awlaki 
on targeted killing list in February of 2010, even though he was an American citizen by dint 
of being born in New Mexico.213 After several failed attempts, a U.S. drone strike killed 
Awlaki on September 30 while he was in transit near the Saudi border.214 
Celebrity Production 
How was Awlaki’s celebrity constructed? This section addresses the manners in 
which the mainstream media and AQAP contributed to his celebrity status. The following 
section will focus on Awlaki’s personal brand and how he developed his celebrity himself.  
By the Media 
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Awlaki was moderately popular and well-known in a traditional celebrity sense even 
before he went to Yemen and joined AQAP. Awlaki gained acclaim within the mainstream 
Muslim and Salafist communities in the United States and the United Kingdom: “by 2000 he 
was one of the most well known English speaking Islamic preachers in the United States.”215 
He gained further exposure after September 11th, when National Geographic and PBS 
conducted interviews with the imam, and Awlaki participated in an online Q&A hosted by 
the Washington Post.  
Yet it was his connections to two high-profile terrorist attacks on American soil that 
garnered the most media coverage and elevated his celebrity profile. Awlaki was “thrust into 
the media spotlight” after his connection with Nidal Hasan broke after the attack on Fort 
Hood.216 At the time, Awlaki was thought to have been involved in the planning of the attack, 
and news outlets wanted to know about Awlaki. Al Jazeera conducted an interview with 
Awlaki in which he explained his relationship to and support for Hasan.217 The media 
attention intensified after the failed Christmas Day airplane bombing. Al Jazeera again 
interviewed Awlaki, who identified Abdulmutallab as his student and praised him for his 
actions.218 Additionally, in July 2010 the first release of AQAP’s magazine Inspire led to a 
flood of Western media coverage. Western news outlets clung to a rare case of English 
jihadist propaganda and occasionally sensationalized coverage of the threat that the magazine 
presented.219 In turn, this gave Awlaki “an international spotlight unmatched by any terrorist 
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other than Osama bin Laden.”220 Awlaki’s celebrity status was initially built by media 
coverage, but it was maintained and amplified much further by actions of his organization 
and his own practice of micro-celebrity.  
By the Organization (AQAP) 
 Awlaki’s terrorist organization, AQAP, also had a hand in creating his celebrity 
status. In July 2010, AQAP released the first issue of an English-language web magazine 
named Inspire. The glossy magazine had high production value and looked like many other 
online publications. Fellow AQAP member and American citizen Samir Khan served as the 
editor of the magazine until his death in the same drone strike as Awlaki. Inspire features 
articles on jihadi ideology, how to commit certain types of attacks, and testimonials from 
current members about their reasons for joining. Analysts such as J.M. Berger have been 
quick to note that this is not the first time jihadists have published English language 
magazines online.221 And Nacos’ aptly titled chapter “Terrorists Have Always Found 
Alternative Media: Same Objectives, Different Technology,” serves as a reminder that Inspire 
merely represents a contemporary manifestation of the terrorist pamphlets of the 20th 
century.222 Yet an analysis of Inspire demonstrates how the magazine contributed to Awlaki’s 
celebrity status.  
 AQAP gave Awlaki a platform through Inspire: while he was alive, Awlaki often 
authored the cover story of the magazine, which increased his visibility. Awlaki authored the 
cover article in half of the eight issues published before his death. Moreover, as previously 
noted, the news media took serious interest in Awlaki following the first release of Inspire. 
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By placing Awlaki prominently in the publication, AQAP ensured that he would be covered 
by the mass media, thus increasing Awlaki’s notoriety. Inspire also included opportunities 
for direct contact with Awlaki: the fifth issue featured a half page advertisement for “an 
exclusive video interview with the Shaykh where he will answer your questions.223  
Awlaki’s Personal Brand 
In order to fully understand how Awlaki himself took actions to increase his celebrity 
status, his personal brand must first be identified. Every micro-celebrity has a personal brand 
meant to appeal to a specific audience. Personal identity is treated like a “branded good”: it 
must be carefully maintained and marketed through micro-celebrity practices.224 The personal 
brand itself is key to this process; if identity is treated as a commodity, then the micro-
celebrity must find and target consumers.225 This section will analyze the character of the 
personal brand Awlaki created, and the following section examines the ways in which 
Awlaki propagated and used that brand. Three key elements of Awlaki’s brand are identified. 
First, he modeled himself as being an authoritative voice on theology, irrespective of his lack 
of theological credentials. Second, he targeted aspects of his personal brand towards English 
speakers. Lastly, Awlaki specifically geared his personal brand towards Muslims living in the 
West, often by sharing his own experiences growing up in the United States. 
Authoritative Religious Voice 
 After serving as an imam for years, Awlaki developed a personal brand as an 
authoritative voice on Islam. Yet he did so without having any formal religious training or 
education in theology. Regardless, his followers still were impressed by the authority with 
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which he spoke. One comment on an online forum is particularly illustrative: “there is no 
need to find out if he is at par with true scholars or is he just an “imam”. He is a leader whose 
message is very, very relevant for today’s Muslims. So, listen to him. You can’t go wrong, 
insha’Allah.”226 
  Awlaki created this brand in particular by making jihad more accessible for many 
people. In his “Constants on the Path of Jihad” lecture, Awlaki argued that serious religious 
instruction was not necessary before engaging in jihad.227 In saying so, he was lowering the 
barriers to entry to jihad for anyone listening. That lecture, often cited as his most well-
known, was not even an original work. It was a translation of a work by Yusuf al-‘Uyayri, 
the founder of the Al Qaeda affiliate in Saudi Arabia.228 In that lecture, he also translated the 
original text into less formal language, thus making the very lecture more accessible.229 
Awlaki replaced al-‘Uyayri’s traditional religious style of writing to one that used stories to 
provide a more relatable and emotional speech.230 By presenting himself as a learned scholar 
of Islam and translating previous texts with his own flair, Awlaki lowered the barriers to 
entry for his followers.  
Targeting English Speakers 
 In addition to building a brand as a religious scholar, Awlaki’s personal brand 
specifically targeted English speakers. As a young imam in the United States, Awlaki’s 
American accent stood in stark contrast to the heavy accents of the older imams who had 
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immigrated to the United States.231 With the exception of Arabic words peppered into his 
lectures, which acted to bolster his image as a religious authority, all of Awlaki’s writings 
and sermons were delivered in English. In his 2010 statement, “Western Jihad is Here to 
Stay,” Awlaki famously proclaimed that “jihad is becoming as American as apple pie and as 
British as afternoon tea.”232 Awlaki believed that he could make the transnational Salafi 
jihadi movement palatable to segments of western populations by speaking their language. 
This is clearly shown by his pattern of frequently translating work from Arabic to English, 
adding his own flair to the delivery, and packaging the final product as his own, just as he did 
for his “Constants” lecture. 
Moreover, he often spoke in plain English, using idioms that westerners would be familiar 
with.  
Targeting Muslims living in the West 
 In line with his targeting of English speakers, the most important audience for Awlaki 
was Muslims living in Western countries. Awlaki repeatedly spoke of Muslim alienation in 
the west, and his brand sought to highlight tensions and harp on grievances in order to gain 
support.233 Awlaki was able to do this because he himself had lived in the United States and 
Britain, and he frequently shared his own experiences as a way of developing this aspect of 
his personal brand. For example, in his 2010 audio statement titled “Message to the 
American people,” Awlaki focused on the tension he felt as both a Muslim and an American 
citizen: 
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“I for one, was born in the US, I lived in the US for twenty-one years. 
America was my home. I was a preacher of Islam, involved in non-violent 
Islamic activism. However, with the American invasion of Iraq, and continued 
US aggression against Muslims, I could not reconcile between living in the 
US and being a Muslim, and I eventually came to the conclusion that Jihad 
against America is binding upon myself, just as it is binding on every other 
able Muslim. Nidal Hassan was not recruited by Al-Qaida. Nidal Hassan was 
recruited by American crimes, and this is what America refuses to admit. 
America refuses to admit that its foreign policies are the reason behind a man 
like Nidal Hassan, born and raised in the US, turning his guns against 
American soldiers. And the more crimes that America commits, the more 
Mujahideen will be recruited to fight against it.”234 
Awlaki sought to use American actions abroad to create an in-group and out-group 
bias among his followers: they could be American citizens and support everything the 
government did, or they could be Muslims bound by jihad, but under this worldview, 
they could not be both.  
Charisma 
 In addition to these three characteristics of his branded persona, Awlaki 
possessed a quality that proved vital to his success: charisma. One member of 
Awlaki’s Denver mosque said that Awlaki “had a beautiful tongue” and “a nice 
voice.”235 Awlaki’s brother Ammar thought he was “a charismatic guy, one of a 
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kind.”236 Awlaki’s charisma was instrumental in his career as an imam. His oratory 
skills gained him not only a series of imam positions at successively larger mosques, 
but also speaking invitations from around the United States.  
Some have argued that his charismatic delivery was key to him becoming a 
successful preacher without receiving formal religious training.237 In the Weberian 
model, Awlaki gained his authority through his gift of impassioned speech, rather 
than a legally authorized position of power or an inherited one. This helps to explain 
why both the masses who bought Awlaki’s CDs in the early 2000s and the more 
radical followers who engaged with him on the internet during the AQAP period 
viewed Awlaki as a religious authority because he spoke confidently and with 
emotion. For example, take this description, from Briton Nussaibah Younis, who met 
Awlaki when she was a teenager and he was preaching in the United Kingdom: 
When I hit 17, I attended a 10-day Islamic studies course and was thrilled to 
discover that Awlaki was the centrepiece of the schedule. He taught us about 
the life of the prophet Muhammad for three hours a day and it was 
mesmerising. He taught by telling stories. He spoke about the prophet 
Muhammad, his wives, his companions and their lives with such passion, 
intimacy and humour – it was as though he knew them first hand. His stories 
were so good because he wasn't afraid to see the humanity in the characters he 
described. He spoke about their weaknesses as well as their strengths, about 
jealousy, anger, love and lust.238 
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Because of his oratory skills and savvy use of social media, Awlaki was dubbed the 
“bin Laden of the Internet.”239 However, this comparison obscures the real and important 
differences between the two. As Shane notes, “Osama bin Laden had helped pioneer the use 
of the internet to promote violent jihad, but his web performances were in Arabic and favored 
obscure poetry and high-flown rhetoric that sometimes bordered on the incomprehensible, 
especially to Western audiences.”240 While the two may seem similar at first—both were 
bearded figures who sat and spoke directly into the camera—their approaches were quite 
different. Awlaki not only spoke in English, but also spoke directly to the experience of 
living as a Muslim in the West. Awlaki’s flair for storytelling was also more digestible. Thus, 
Awlaki both literally spoke in a language his target audience understood, English, and in a 
manner that would connect with them by speaking to the experience of living as a Muslim in 
western countries. In this manner, Awlaki’s charisma acted to bolster his three-pronged 
personal brand that was precisely targeted towards a different population than bin Laden 
typically spoke to. 
Micro-Celebrity Practices 
Anwar al-Awlaki deliberately created a personal brand targeted towards English 
speaking Muslims living in Western countries. He sought to inspire and to make Salafi jihad 
more accessible. Once he had built his branded identity, Awlaki engaged in micro-celebrity 
practices to capitalize on and maintain his celebrity status. Yet even before he joined AQAP, 
Awlaki had a long history of understanding the importance of using text and video to reach 
out to others. He always had an eye for imaging and branding. After becoming a popular 
preacher in his own mosques as well as in traveling appearances, Awlaki began finding ways 
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to increase his visibility. When Anwar’s brother Ammar visited Anwar in San Diego in 1998, 
Ammar stood on the sidewalk outside the mosque and sold audio recordings on cassette of 
Anwar’s recent lecture series.241 In February 2000, after only six years of being a full-time 
imam, Awlaki created a Nevada-based corporation named Al Fahm Inc. to sell CDs of his 
lectures.242 Awlaki effectively capitalized on his status by mass producing his content, thus 
spreading it to more followers in the form of audio lectures. This early fascination with audio 
and visual led to Awlaki’s range of micro-celebrity practices as an actual member of AQAP. 
As Shane notes, “[Awlaki] appears to have lived his entire professional life before audio and 
video recorders.”243 
 Awlaki used a variety of mediums with which to propagate his personal brand and 
connect with followers. In June 2008, he launched a blog, “Anwar-Awlaki.com”.244 The blog 
was only online from May 2008 to November 2009, but provided a platform to connect with 
followers.245 Similarly, Awlaki’s Facebook page, which had 4,800 likes, was taken down 
shortly after the Fort Hood attack, when Awlaki had praised Hasan’s actions.246 Lastly, 
Awlaki encouraged followers to share and spread his material, and thousands of his audio 
and video lectures have been posted on YouTube, other video-hosting sites, and jihadist 
forums.  
Awlaki largely engaged in celebrity and micro-celebrity practices that mirrored those 
of the mainstream. In particular, this made him very relatable to a young generation who 
grew up seeing such practices every day. For example, in January 2009 Awlaki released a 
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blog post titled “44 Ways of Supporting Jihad”. Each item had a least a paragraph of text, but 
the overall structure was simple and easily digestible. Moreover, the title and structure of the 
piece strongly evoke that of a Buzzfeed list article, commonly known as a “listicle,” which 
became famous at around the same time. Number 29 on the list is “WWW Jihad”, which 
encourages followers to establish online forums and share jihadi literature.247 This provides a 
follow-on activity for fans to do once they finish reading Awlaki’s post, thus keeping them 
involved.  
Yet it was not enough to merely produce content—like all micro-celebrity 
practitioners, Awlaki sought to strategically interact with his followers. In his first blog post, 
Awlaki explained the benefits he received from online communication, and displayed some 
of his own micro-celebrity attitudes towards followers:  
“Now we can communicate all over the globe within seconds; text, audio and 
video, all within seconds. So I would like to tell all of the brothers out there 
whom I personally know and whom I spent memorable time with: Assalamu 
alaykum and isha Allah I will never forget you. And to those whom I grew to 
know through these modern means of communication but the circumstances 
have separated me from meeting them, nevertheless, I still feel a bond with 
them and I love them for the sake of Allah because they have chosen to follow 
Islam.”248  
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Awlaki’s final comment about still feeling a bond with others he only met over the 
internet represents the potential for intimacy with celebrities that is afforded by new 
media technology. 
 Awlaki’s fans endearingly called him “Sheikh Anwar”.249 In turn, Awlaki fully 
embraced the moniker. His blog featured a page called “Contact the Sheikh” and Inspire 
frequently referred to Awlaki as “Sheikh Anwar”. Awlaki’s blog allowed followers to 
comment on each post, and “Contact the Sheikh” page enabled fans could submit questions 
directly to the cleric himself.250 Awlaki’s followers readily made use of these features. For 
example, his “44 Ways” post received 737 comments in ten days.251 AQAP’s Inspire featured 
a similar opportunity; the fifth issue included a half-page advertisement for “an exclusive 
video interview with the Shaykh where he will answer your questions.”252  
Awlaki made sure that this was not a one-way relationship; he frequently responded 
to follower questions in both public and private venues. In addition to responding personally 
to messages, several of his blog posts stated “I have gotten several questions about [x],” and 
then addressed that topic, showing he was interacting with followers by providing the content 
for which they asked. Awlaki’s cover article in the eighth issue of Inspire begins by 
explaining that the most asked question from the issue four advertisement was “the legality 
of targeting non-combatants in countries that are at war with the Muslims.”253 Awlaki 
dedicated his cover article to the topic of killing civilians as a direct response to fan 
questions. This article is particularly interesting because it combines all facets of Awlaki’s 
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personal brand: it is written in English, provides an Islamic legal argument, and is targeted to 
those living in Western countries.  
Moreover, his online presence attracted engagement with followers who, inspired 
partly by Awlaki, were eager to take his words and turn them into action. Zachary Chesser, 
who was convicted in 2010 of trying to join al-Shabab and violently threatening the creators 
of South Park online, regularly commented on Awlaki’s blog.254 Awlaki even responded to 
Chesser’s emails on two occasions. 255 In a similar case, Nidal Hasan, the Fort Hood shooter, 
began sending Awlaki messages via the “Contact the Sheikh” page starting on December 17, 
2008.256 The exchange is representative of Awlaki’s personal brand. Hasan frequently asked 
for comment on the Islamic legal or religious logic and rationale for various attacks, and he 
was clearly turning to Awlaki because of the authoritative religious voice brand. In one 
email, Hasan labeled himself as a “novice” who was seeking Awlaki’s “reassurance.”257 
Additionally, Hasan seemed to be swayed by Awlaki’s celebrity status. On February 16, 
2009, he wrote that he was creating a $5,000 prize for an essay contest with the topic “Why 
is Anwar Al Awlaki a great activist and leader.”258 Awlaki responded only twice to Hasan’s 
fifteen emails, but in his second reply asked Hasan to tell Awlaki more about himself, 
showing an effort to engage in strategic intimacy.259 
Awlaki also propagated his personal brand through articles published in the AQAP 
magazine Inspire. Take, for example, the “main article for the first issue” of Inspire, which 
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Awlaki authored.260 Titled “May Our Souls be Sacrificed For You!” the article described how 
to protect the Prophet Muhammad from slander.261 Awlaki explained that protest—in the 
form of burning flags and effigies, and using boycotts—had failed. Therefore, he argued that 
the proper response to defamation of the Prophet is “execution of those involved” and 
situated his argument in the literature by stating that this is the “medicine prescribed” by the 
Prophet and giving a historical example.262 Awlaki specifically stated the name of a Seattle 
cartoonist who he wanted to make “a prime target of assassination.”263 Yet he didn’t limit 
targets to those creating cartoons, but also targeted the “system that is offering them support 
and protection,” including the government, media, and law enforcement.264 By drawing on 
theology, this article represents Awlaki’s brand as an authoritative scholar, and by engaging 
with a contemporary controversy about Islam in the West (depictions of the Prophet), the 
article also contains some of Awlaki’s personal brand of creating tension for Muslims living 
in the West. 
Overall, it is clear that Awlaki took care to build a personal brand and market that 
persona through various platforms: Facebook, YouTube, his blog, and Inspire. He portrayed 
himself as a learned scholar of Islam and targeted English-speaking Muslims by creating a 
sense of tension between being a Muslim and living in the West. Awlaki not only produced 
content, but engaged with followers through email and Q&A sessions. Yet how did Awlaki’s 
death impact his celebrity status? 
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Martyrdom 
 Almost immediately following Awlaki’s death in the September 2011 drone strike, he 
was hailed as a martyr to the cause of transnational Salafi jihadism. Yet Awlaki’s case 
represents a different type of celebrity than the typical terrorist martyr, who is unknown 
before they commit a suicide attack. Instead, Awlaki already had a large public profile, 
which was then amplified in death. While this is different than the typical terrorist martyr, 
there were important changes to Awlaki’s celebrity status that occurred after he died. 
 Awlaki’s death did not stop the maintenance of his celebrity profile. In fact, AQAP’s 
efforts to celebritize Awlaki only increased after his death. The first issue of Inspire to be 
released after his death was largely devoted to Awlaki, featuring a record seven articles 
mentioning Awlaki. These included “My Story with Awlaki,” a five page article by an 
AQAP member that speaks in glowing terms of Awlaki’s “solid knowledge” of Islam and 
labels Awlaki as “of the best Islamic preachers in the English language.”265 The second page 
of that issue features two pictures of a smiling Awlaki and one partial picture of him holding 
a rifle.266  
A basic analysis of Inspire content over time demonstrates a great increase in Awlaki-
related content after his death (see figure 3.1). Eight issues were released before his death 
and nine have been released since. In the issues before his death, an average of 0.75 articles 
per issue were written or translated by Awlaki and an average of 1.25 articles mentioned 
Awlaki. In contrast, the nine issues released since Awlaki’s death feature an average of 0.667 
articles written or translated by Awlaki and an average of 3.89 articles mentioning Awlaki. 
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Posts by Awlaki dipped slightly, which is sensible because the group could only rely on 
unreleased drafts or transcripts of previous lectures. Yet the issue with the greatest number of 
articles by Awlaki was released in 2014, two and a half years after his death. What is most 
telling is the drastic increase in articles mentioning Awlaki. The three issues after Awlaki’s 
death featured either six or seven articles mentioning Awlaki, whereas before his death he 
had only been mentioned in a maximum of two articles in an issue. This demonstrates that 
AQAP sought to keep Awlaki in its follower’s collective memory and use him as a continual 
tool for recruitment.  Lastly, AQAP used Inspire to revive the micro-celebrity practices of 
Awlaki. Issues 12 and 13 featured Q&A’s with Awlaki. These may have been either faked or 
real answers from before his death, but regardless they symbolized a revival of Awlaki’s 
strategic engagement with fans.  
Figure 3.1: Inspire Breakdown 
Issue Date Articles 
Authored 
or 
Translated 
by Awlaki 
Cover 
Article 
Number of 
Articles 
Mentioning 
Awlaki 
Type of Mentions 
1 Summer 
2010 
1 Yes 2 “Hear the World”, mentioned in 
interview with AQAP head 
2 Fall 2010 2 No 0 N/A 
3 November 
2010 
0 No 1 “Hear the World”  
4 Winter 
2010 
1 Yes 2 “Inspire Reactions,” “Inspire 
Feedback” 
5 Spring 
2011 
1 Yes 1 “Protest Focus”  
6 Summer 
2011 
0 No 2 “Reactions,” News Flash (celebrating 
the fact that drone strikes had missed 
Awlaki) 
7 Fall 2011 0 No 1 “A Decade in Pictures” 
8 Fall 2011 1 Yes 1 “Letter from the Editor”  
9 Winter 
2012 
1 No 7 “Letter from the Editor,” “Inspire 
Continues to Inspire,” “My Story 
with Al Awlaki,” “They Killed 
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Father, They Killed Son,” “This is 
How We Win and This is How You 
Lose,” “Do the Mujahideen and 
Christian Terrorists Have Similar 
Goals?,” “Winning on the Ground”  
10 Spring 
2013 
0 No 6 “Letter from the Editor,” “Hear the 
World,” “Inspire Reactions,” 
“Brother ‘Askar, Abu Yazeed Al 
Qatary,” “America Will Never Profit 
from the Assassination of Imam 
Anwar Awlaki,” “We are All Usama”  
11 Spring 
2013 
0 No 7 “Hear the World,” “Inspire 
Reactions,” “Message to the 
American Nation,” “Words of 
Wisdom,” “Dear American Muslim,” 
“Inspired by ‘Inspire’,” “Who and 
Why”  
12 Spring 
2014 
2 No 4 “Inspire Reactions,” “City Wolves,” 
“24/7 Terrorism,” “Shattered: A 
Story About Change”  
13 Winter 
2014 
3 No 3 “Editor’s Letter,”  
Inspire Reactions,” “Words of 
Wisdom”  
14 Summer 
2015 
0 No 3 “Statement Regarding the Blessed 
Paris Operation: “Vengeance for the 
Prophet”,” “Hear the World,” 
“Words of Wisdom”   
15 Spring 
2016 
0 No 1 “Hear the World”  
16 Fall 2016 0 No 1 “Echoes of Events”  
17 Summer 
2017 
0 No 3 “Editor’s Letter,” “American Raids in 
Yemen,” “Exclusive Inspire 
Interview: Sheikh Abu Mus’ab Abdul 
Wadood,”  
 
 Awlaki’s material also remained readily available. In particular, his videos remained 
on YouTube and gained thousands of views. In June 2016, a search by Shane found 40,000 
results in 2013 and 65,000 in June 2016.267 Not only were some of his speeches staying 
online, they were also being re-uploaded regularly, which helps to account for the increase 
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the number of results. In a 2017 search, one lecture had been uploaded only eight months 
prior.268 However, in a large move by the video-hosting site, in November 2017 YouTube 
took down over 50,000 of videos with content from Awlaki.269 Prior to that move, the most 
recent research on Awlaki’s videos, an August 2017 study by the Counter Extremism Project 
found a search for Awlaki’s name on YouTube produced 70,100 results.270 After the take-
down, only 18,600 results came up from the same search, and many were news clips about 
Awlaki, coverage of the debate over whether killing him was justified, and criticism of his 
work by Islamic scholars.271 
Due to his martyr status, Awlaki continues to be a major presence in transnational 
jihad. Al Qaeda central and the affiliates continue to use Awlaki’s image and words. 
Moreover, even though he was a propagandist for Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, itself a 
splinter group of Al Qaeda, has dutifully embraced him. In newsletters and online postings, 
Islamic State members frequently suggest Awlaki’s lectures and writings to followers.272 
Islamic State fighters often quote Awlaki, and the group named a brigade of English-
speaking foreign fighters after Awlaki.273 Going above and beyond memorializing, the 
Islamic State is not above appropriating Awlaki’s material. The Islamic State’s English 
language magazines, first Dabiq and then Rumiyah, clearly take inspiration from Khan and 
Awlaki’s Inspire magazine. Dabiq’s fourth issue even featured a picture of Awlaki.274 In 
December of 2013, the Islamic State released a video that featured audio from Awlaki’s 2008 
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speech at a South Africa conference in which he praised the Islamic State of Iraq, the 
predecessor to the Islamic State.275 Yet with expert editing, it appeared as if Awlaki, from the 
grave, was sanctioning the Islamic State in its current form. As Shane notes, “the upstart 
Islamic State used his words for the jihadi equivalent of a celebrity endorsement.”276 
 Awlaki’s inspiration has been found in many attacks after his death. From 2011 to 
2016, Shane found Awlaki’s influence present in over half of the U.S. jihadist terrorism 
cases.277 These include the Boston Bombing, and the Garland, San Bernardino, and Orlando 
shootings. Each individual or group involved had watched and read Awlaki’s work. Orlando 
gunman Omar Mateen found Awlaki’s lectures “very powerful” and one American who 
conducted a suicide attack in Syria noted in a martyrdom video that he was inspired by 
Awlaki’s words comparing devotion to jihad to jumping off a cliff with faith.278 While the 
presence of Awlaki’s material doesn’t equal causation, it does show the enduring influence 
and relevance of Awlaki in transnational jihad.  
Celebrity Significance 
Why does Awlaki’s celebrity matter, and what effect did it have? As Shane notes “in 
the world of online extremism, celebrity matters.”279 Celebrity extremists inspire others to 
commit attacks, and they can use their status to recruit new members to an organization. In 
particular, micro-celebrity practitioners can use their targeted personal brand to find and 
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entice recruits. However, in examining this phenomenon it is important to denote the limits 
of analysis. It is not wholly possible to draw causation in every case. However, it is possible 
to understand the correlations between branding, recruitment, and terrorist attacks.  
Awlaki’s audio lectures, videos, and writings have been found in relation to numerous 
plots while he was alive, in addition to the previously discussed connections to plots after his 
death. By the time Awlaki was killed, his “Constants of Jihad” lecture had been heard by and 
potentially influenced “the Fort Dix Six, a number of Somali-Americans recruited into al-
Shabab, Alaskans Paul and Nadia Rockwood, New Jersey residents Mohamed Alessa and 
Carlos Almonte, the Toronto 18 in Canada, and Rajib Karim in the United Kingdom.”280 A 
direct link cannot be tied between listening to a lecture and committing a terrorist attack; 
however, the ubiquity of Awlaki’s material in plots and attacks in the West demonstrates his 
status as a go-to voice of jihad for many disciples. The connection becomes clearer in cases 
where Awlaki was directly in contact with followers and engaging in strategic intimacy. For 
many, this was an opportunity to speak to the revered “Sheikh Anwar.” In Nidal Hasan’s 
case, he wanted Awlaki to give his blessing over a potential attack but never received a clear 
reply. Awlaki also was in direct contact with Umar Abdulmutallab, Zachary Chesser, Samir 
Khan, Mohammed Hamid, Rajid Karim, and Hisham Assem.281 An analysis of one case 
demonstrates the way in which Awlaki’s personal brand and celebrity status were intertwined 
with the recruitment for and planning of a terrorist attack. 
 One case in particular serves to illustrate the manner in which Awlaki’s celebrity 
status played a role in his interacted with the recruitment of operatives and planning of 
terrorist attacks: the 2010 plot by Rajib Karim and Awlaki to commit a terrorist attack on a 
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British Airways flight to the United States. Karim had been a British Airways information 
technology employee since 2007.282 Rajib was put into contact with Awlaki through his 
brother Tehzeeb, who was living in Yemen.283 Rajib and Awlaki began emailing in 2009, 
shortly after his brother met in person with Awlaki.284 Rajib also wished to travel to Yemen 
and join the fight himself, but Awlaki convinced Rajib that it was more valuable for him to 
stay in England and commit an attack in the West.285 Awlaki had a distinct focus on attacking 
the United States, and asked Karim about how much access he had at Heathrow, for 
information on British Airways security measures, and if it would be possible to get an 
explosive package on board a flight to the United States.286 Karim even volunteered to 
become a flight attendant and conduct a suicide bombing on board a plane, but his 
application was denied.287 
From 2009 to 2010, Awlaki and Karim communicated through a complicated system 
of encrypted texts. The four-step process involved writing messages in Microsoft Excel, then 
saving and password protecting in Microsoft Word, encrypting through the compression 
program RAR, and finally uploading online through a URL shortener website.288 For an 
understanding of how sophisticated this encryption was, it took British authorities nine 
months to decipher the messages after confiscating Karim’s hard drive during the arrest.289 
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Karim was eventually arrested in February 2010 and then convicted one year later, 
preventing the plot from progressing past the planning stage. 
 What was the involvement of Awlaki’s celebrity in the plot? It is clear that the Karim 
brothers felt honored to be speaking with Awlaki. In an email from Tehzeeb to Awlaki, the 
former wrote that “it fills our heart with happiness to be in direct communication with you. 
only allah knows what we feel about you. and this is from the honor which allah bestows on 
those who honor his words and his deen [religion] and its sanctities.”290  In stating their 
happiness to be in contact with Awlaki, the brothers specifically cite part of Awlaki’s 
personal brand; by saying that Awlaki is someone who honors god’s will, Rehzeeb alludes to 
Awlaki’s image as a learned scholar of Islam. In turn, Awlaki engaged in strategic 
interaction, contacting the brothers not only with operational instructions, but also with 
messages to maintain the relationship. For example, after one U.S. drone strike “Al-Awlaki 
sent the brothers a personal audio message confirming that he had survived a US missile 
attack. Rajib told Tehzeen that, “hearing the shaykh's voice filled my heart with joy.””291 The 
brothers not only felt honored to speak with the celebrity Awlaki, but also were emotionally 
invested in his survival. 
 Awlaki’s personal brand is evident in much of the communication with the Karim 
brothers. Had Rajib gained the flight attendant position, he would have been forced to engage 
in activities such as serving alcohol. Rajib treated Awlaki as a religious authority and 
inquired whether or not that was sanctioned if the actions were carried out with the ultimate 
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aim of jihad.292 Karim also discussed the tension of living as a Muslim in a western country, a 
key part of Awlaki’s personal brand:  
“Dear shaykh…I always write to my brother saying how depressed I am living 
in Britain and how I hate myself for not making hijra and also not being able 
to do anything here…from the moment I entered this country my niya 
[intention] was to do something for the deen [religion], it was not to make a 
living here and start enjoying life in this country. As month after month and 
then slowly years went by without anything happening and also not being able 
to have any concrete plans to do anything here, my iman [faith] was getting 
affected. I started feeling like a real munafiq [hypocrite]. It has been three 
years that I have been living here away from the company of good brothers 
and spending a good part of my working day with the kuffar [non-
Muslims].”293 
In contemporary terms, Karim could be considered what Byman has labeled a “frustrated 
foreign fighter”: someone who wishes to join the transnational jihad abroad but is prevented 
from doing so.294 Karim wanted very badly to travel to Yemen to fight, but did not. In 
Karim’s case, he was blocked only by wanting to stay with his family in the U.K. Yet Awlaki 
was able to convince him to stay by arguing that Karim had more value in the U.K. than in 
Yemen. In turn, Awlaki took the tension evidenced in Karim’s email and provided him an 
outlet—committing an attack at home on an airliner. 
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Conclusion 
Awlaki represents a combination of several forms of celebrity, from his traditional 
engagement with mass media to AQAP’s efforts to make him a martyr (see figure 3.2). Most 
consequentially, Awlaki opened the door in terms of using new platforms to propagate his 
personal brand, and he produced content through speeches and articles that was consistent 
with that brand. However, Awlaki only tried to operationalize this celebrity twice: once in 
person with Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab and once virtually with Rajib Karim. He operated 
during the infancy of contemporary social media. Facebook had only been open to the public 
for four years when Awlaki was killed in September 2010.  In the ensuing years, 
communications technology and social media platforms improved greatly, and with that 
came a shift in cultural attitudes about communication. More contact was expected over the 
internet, and even constant contact was normal. In turn, a new terrorist celebrity materialized: 
the Twitter celebrity and virtual planner, which will be explored in the next chapter. 
Figure 3.2: Awlaki’s Celebrity Traits 
Type of 
Celebrity 
Awlaki examples Significance Cases 
Traditional 
Celebrity 
Interviews with Al Jazeera, 
media coverage after the Fort 
Hood and Underwear Bomber 
attacks 
Gained notoriety, 
particularly in the 
United States 
N/A 
Martyr Inspire magazine coverage 
greatly increased after his 
death, audio and video 
lectures continue to circulate, 
and the Islamic State has 
memorialized Awlaki in 
various ways 
Continues to inspire 
members of the 
transnational Salafi 
jihadist movement, 
taken up by Islamic 
State 
Omar Mateen, 
Tsarnaev 
brothers  
Internet 
Celebrity 
Blog posts, interaction with 
fans, video and audio lectures, 
personal brand that targeted 
English-speaking Muslims 
Engaged with 
followers one-on-one 
Rajib Karim, 
Zachary Chesser, 
Nidal Hasan 
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Chapter Four: Junaid Hussain 
 Following Awlaki’s death, the rise of the Islamic State led to the emergence of a new 
type of terrorist internet micro-celebrity: the virtual planner. In contrast to Awlaki’s role as 
an inspiring preacher who could give a blessing for an attack to followers who asked, the 
virtual planners are more focused on recruiting specific individuals and actually planning 
attacks. These planners are typically foreign fighters in Syria who recruit, train, and direct 
sympathizers in the fighter’s country of origin using digital, and typically encrypted, 
communications. Often the planners are among the most prominent foreign fighters from 
their country. They include the British fighter Junaid Hussain, Frenchmen Rachid Kassim 
and Maxime Hauchard, Australian Neil Prakash, Indonesians Bahrun Naim, Bahrumsyah, 
and Abu Jandal, Malaysian Muhammad Wanndy Mohamed Jedi, and Hindi-speaking Abu 
Issa al-Amriki.295 Ten planners are linked with the majority of the virtual plots and attacks: 
half were featured prominently in Islamic State propaganda videos and all managed active 
social media profiles that attracted followers.296 
Unlike the early terrorist internet micro-celebrities, these fighters are largely no 
longer pseudonymous or anonymous. The days of Irhabi007 hiding behind a screenname 
were gone—instead the micro-celebrity foreign fighter might be featured in a beheading 
video with their face on display to the world. Each became a jihadi “rock-star” through their 
online presence and by dint of their Islamic State membership, and they represent the current 
culmination of the evolving types of terrorist celebrity.297 
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 Perhaps the most prolific of the virtual planners was Junaid Hussain, a British 
national who traveled to Syria in 2013 and joined the Islamic State. At the time of his death 
in 2015, Hussain was connected to at least nine plots or attacks in the United Kingdom, 
United States, and Australia. This section investigates Hussain’s personal brand and micro-
celebrity practices. The Hussain case was chosen for several reasons. First, he was among the 
most prolific virtual planners. Hussain is connected to at least nine attacks or plots, behind 
only Naim’s eleven.298 Additionally, Hussain managed to build one of the biggest public 
profiles of an Islamic State foreign fighter through micro-celebrity practices. Most notably, 
his profile rose considerably when he convinced British citizen Sally Jones to marry him and 
move to Syria, and the two together became well known. Evidence is drawn from Hussain’s 
social media postings, court records of cases in which Hussain was involved, and media 
reports on Hussain. While Hussain played an important role in his organization, he was a less 
central and less public figure than Awlaki. Instead, Hussain represents someone who built his 
brand largely on his own, without help from an organization. Additionally, Hussain was far 
more accessible and engaged with his followers than Awlaki. This represents the most recent 
manifestation of terrorist internet micro-celebrity and provides a sense of what future 
iterations might look like. 
Case Study Background 
 Hussain was born in 1994 in Birmingham, England. He grew up in Kings Heath, a 
suburb just south of Birmingham and was of Pakistani descent. At age 11, Hussain was 
hacked while playing an online game. To seek revenge, he began browsing online forums 
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and reading tutorials to teach himself how to hack.299 When Hussain was 13 he took on the 
moniker TriCk; he would use the pseudonym for all of his online activity and hacks until he 
joined the Islamic State.300 Yet it was not until two years later that Hussain transition from 
viewing hacking as a game to hacking as a vocation and a form of activism. According to 
Hussain, he “became political” when he “started watching videos of children getting killed in 
countries like Kashmir & Palestine…I then started using hacking as my form of medium by 
defacing sites to raise awareness of issues around the world and to "bully" corrupt 
organizations and embarrass them via leaks etc., which is how I got into hacktivism.”301 It 
was at that time that Hussain created the hacking forum “p0ison.org” and shortly afterward 
co-founded a hacking collective named TeaMp0isoN.302 Hussain then studied information 
technology at Wheelers Lane Technology College and Aston University.303 
Most of Hussain’s hacks at this point targeted private corporations and national 
governments: the group gained access to Israeli credit card numbers and hacked NATO and 
the British Ministry of Defense.304 In June 2011, Hussain hacked former Prime Minister Tony 
Blair’s former advisor’s email and posted her contacts, including Blair’s email address, 
online.305 He also called the United Kingdom national terrorism hotline 111 times over three 
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days, which effectively prevented others from calling in.306 Hussain was arrested and served 
six months in total for both charges.  
 After being released from prison, Hussain seemed to be more violent and ready to 
take up arms rather than just hacking.307 This turn had been presaged in a 2012 interview in 
which Hussain stated: “I don’t recognize the law or its enforcers, I don’t fear "prison" – at 
least I’d be blocked from the mad world outside, I’d be able to focus on myself and practice 
my religion more. I don’t fear no one except god (Allah).”308 The reasons for this shift are 
unclear. It may be that prison was a radicalizing experience for him; as one hacker friend of 
Hussain’s described, “I think we put someone with leadership skills who had committed only 
nonviolent crimes around actual criminals and created a monster.”309 It also seems that 
Hussain began to value direct action more than mere hacking after his time in prison.310 
Lastly, Hussain’s friend suspected that anti-South Asian racism in the United Kingdom may 
have driven him towards a group like the Islamic State.311 As a hacktivist, Hussain had 
championed the cause of Muslims in Kashmir and the Occupied Territories, so the turn to 
Salafi jihadism is a potential, albeit radical, extension of his previous campaign. Regardless 
of the reason, Hussain traveled to Syria in 2013 and formally joined the Islamic State.312  
Once in Syria, Hussain played two roles. First, he utilized his considerable hacking 
skills. Hussain became one of the leaders of the CyberCaliphate, the Islamic State hacking 
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division.313 The CyberCaliphate’s most well-known action occurred in January 2015 when 
they took over the U.S. Central Command Twitter account; the profile picture and banner 
were changed to black images with text supportive of IS, and IS-related tweets were 
posted.314 Hussain’s second role within the Islamic State was as a recruiter and planner. 
Hussain led “The Legion” or “Raqqa 12”, the Raqqa-based collective of online recruiters and 
virtual planners.315 The group used social media accounts and encrypted messaging to 
connect with sympathizers around the world and encourage them to either come to Syria or 
conduct an attack at home. Hussain was one of the most prolific of these recruiters and 
planners.  
 In one of his online encounters, Hussain met Sally Jones, a punk rock guitarist from 
Greenwich. Jones converted, married him, and moved to Syria in 2013 with her young son.316 
In turn, Jones became a particularly effective and well known recruiter of western women. 
Hussain’s high-profile hacks and connections to plots in the United States and United 
Kingdom had made him a target of the anti-IS coalition. On August 24, 2015, Hussain was 
killed in a drone strike in Raqqa, Syria. He was possibly located after he clicked a link sent to 
him through SureSpot by British authorities. The “poison link” allowed them to find his 
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location and target him.317 Jones and her son were then reported killed in an October 2017 
drone strike.318 
Celebrity Production 
How was Hussain’s celebrity constructed, first as a hacker and then as a foreign 
fighter with the Islamic State? This section addresses the manner in which the mainstream 
media and the Islamic State contributed to his celebrity status. The following section will 
focus on Hussain’s online personal brand and how he developed his celebrity himself. 
By the Media 
 Hussain garnered some coverage when he was a hacker, but never enough to build a 
large public profile. Each high profile hack would garner some coverage of TriCk and his 
hacking collective. TriCk was able to operate under the pseudonym until his arrest in 2011, 
after which the trial revealed his identity as Junaid Hussain. However, there was little 
attention to the man himself. Short of a 2012 interview with the tech website “softpedia.com” 
that explored Hussain’s childhood and motivations for hacking, most of the coverage merely 
focused on the effects of each hack.319 
This type of media coverage would change once Hussain joined the Islamic State, and 
Western media dove into his past to search for the answer for why he had made the pivot 
from hacktivist to terrorist. Suddenly, media outlets were interested in Hussain’s personal life 
rather than his hacking feats, and began running profiles of his life. Additionally, Hussain’s 
marriage to Sally Jones garnered a lot of media coverage. Nacos described several frames 
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through which media organizations describe female terrorists, and coverage of Jones and 
Hussain most clearly fit into the physical appearance and the “terrorist for the sake of love” 
frames.320 Take for example, The Mirror headline “Mr. and Mrs. Terror”.321 This fits with the 
pattern that there is particular media scrutiny towards female terrorists; Bloom found that 
attacks by female terrorists receive an average of eight times more coverage than those by 
male terrorists.322 However, Hussain never gained a media moniker such as “Jihadi John,” the 
name given to Mohammed Emwazi. Instead, Hussain was referred to only as his legal name 
or his kunya, Abu Hussain al-Britani. In contrast, the media labeled Jones the “White 
Widow,” which added both to her profile and theirs as a couple. Lastly, tabloids and British 
newspapers used undercover employees to reach out to both Hussain and Jones. In one case, 
Hussain coached an employee of The Sun through planning an attack.323 In another, a 
journalist with The Sunday Times posed as a seventeen year-old and approached Jones online 
about how to join the Islamic State.324 Ultimately, media coverage did not seriously 
contribute to Hussain’s celebrity status until he joined the Islamic State, and particularly 
increased after his marriage to Sally Jones. 
By the Organization (Islamic State) 
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While the Islamic State is noted for its media efforts, Hussain was not featured in any 
Islamic State propaganda videos. This tells us that his celebrity allure was largely produced 
through a combination of media coverage and his own online presence. However, the Islamic 
State was strategic in building the brand of their non-Arab foreign fighters by filming videos 
where the fighters explain why they emigrated and call on those from their home country to 
emigrate or commit attacks at home.325 Several of the other virtual planners gained their 
initial celebrity profile by appearing in Islamic State propaganda videos. Most notably were 
the two French planners Maxime Hauchard and Rachid Kassim, who appeared in beheading 
videos in 2014 and 2016, respectively. Australian planner Neil Prakash was the star of a 
twelve-minute recruitment video in May 2015. These videos helped to build visibility for 
each foreign fighter in their country of origin and created credibility for their brands as true 
members of the Islamic State. In turn, each video appearance also garnered mainstream 
media coverage in the country of origin as news outlets ran profiles about each fighter and 
recreated their path to terrorism. 
Hussain’s Personal Brand 
 While media coverage gave Hussain some status and the Islamic State did not use its 
media wings to bolster his profile, it was ultimately Hussain’s actions online that built his 
celebrity status. This section will analyze the character of the personal brand Hussain created, 
and the following section examines the ways in which Hussain propagated and used that 
brand. Hussain had two brands. First, he was the hacker “TriCk,” who used online exploits to 
build a fan base in the hacking community and small-scale notoriety in the general public, 
culminating in his arrest.  Second, he employed the brand of the hardened Islamic State 
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fighter, Abu Hussain al-Britani. Three elements of this terrorist personal brand are identified: 
being a fighter and not only a hacker, being a genuine member of the Islamic State who lived 
in Syria, and being able to connect worldwide sympathizers to the caliphate. 
Hussain as Hacktivist 
 Hussain’s first personal brand was that of the hacker “TriCk”. Hussain’s 2012 
interview with softpedia.org highlighted not only why he became a hacker, but how he 
portrayed himself as one as well. The interviewer specifically used the term “hacktivist”, 
which refers to someone who uses hacking for a political or social purpose. Hacktivism often 
has a defensive logic—hackers view themselves as punishing large corporations or 
governments for their actions. This defensive logic comes through in Hussain’s hacker 
persona. Again, the turning point appeared to have been age 15 for Hussain; he stated that the 
videos of Kashmir and Palestine “made me angry, it changed the way I lived my life and the 
way I saw the world.”326 In turn, hacking was Hussain’s medium to take action; for him, 
“TeaMp0isoN is like Internet Guerilla Warfare.”327 Adding to this defensive logic, in a 2012 
profile of TeaMp0isoN by The Telegraph, Hussain “said he believed the anti-terrorist police 
were the “real terrorists” and said: “Terrorism doesn’t exist. They create the terrorism and 
fabricate it to demonize a certain faith.”328  
Hussain bolstered this personal brand with hacks that fit the persona; in 2012, 
Operation Free Palestine raided Israeli credit card details as a means of highlighting the 
occupation of Palestinian territory.329 Another of TriCk’s hallmarks was defacing websites as 
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“a form of raising awareness.”330 He saw this as a way of getting his message out to 
thousands of people: he claimed 20,000 people viewed his hack of the Daily Mail website, 
which not only increased visibility but also “embarrasses the organization targeted.”331  
Fighter 
 Hussain kept some aspects of this hacker persona when he joined the Islamic State. 
This most notably manifested in his position with the Islamic State’s CyberCaliphate. Each 
of his hacks with the Islamic State spoke for him by demonstrating his hacking ability, which 
then gave him credibility. For example, the CENTCOM hack hit a very high-profile target 
and thus received a lot of attention. That hack was likely largely due to Hussain, who brought 
a wealth of hacking knowledge and experience with him that allowed the CyberCaliphate to 
pull it off.  
Yet while Hussain maintained some of this hacker persona, he specifically altered his 
brand once he joined the Islamic State to portray himself as more of a fighter. Hussain was 
no longer TriCk, but rather the Islamic State member and terrorist fighter “Abu Hussain al-
Britani.” This nickname, or kunya, served as his new Twitter username. Upon marrying 
Hussain, Jones took on a kunya as well: Umm Hussain al-Britani. It is important to note that 
this process is not unusual. In fact, the taking of a kunya is typical of those who join jihadist 
organizations. However, for someone like Hussain whose brand is built online, the use of the 
kunya in his social media profiles represented a key aspect of the way he was changing his 
online presence to be aligned with his new identity and brand. Additionally, Hussain 
concurrently changed his Twitter profile picture to one of him pointing a gun at the camera. 
The account’s profile photo had previously been a child with a Palestinian flag. In this 
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manner, Hussain moved past his image as only a hacker and developed the “persona of a 
hipster thug.”332 
Member of the Islamic State 
 The second element of Hussain’s personal brand was that he was living in Syria and 
was an official member of the Islamic State. Some have argued that virtual planners can do 
their work anywhere.333 Theoretically this is true because of the technology the planners 
relied on. But actually being in Syria added to his credibility and his brand. As Hughes and 
Meleagrou-Hitchens note, virtual planners “may, for example, lose credibility in the eyes of 
Western jihadis gained by the likes of Hussain and Miski who, due to their locations, were 
able to present themselves as legitimate members of terrorist organizations.”334 
Providing a Link to the Caliphate 
 In line with the idea that Hussain was in Syria and a member of the Islamic State, the 
third element of his personal brand was that he acted as a connection between the Islamic 
State and sympathizers around the world. Hussain tweeted about life in the caliphate and 
provided a concrete connection to the Islamic State for potential recruits. When Hussain 
married Jones, it not only built his profile through media coverage, but it added to this 
element of his personal brand. Hussain had proven publically that he could bring you, the 
disaffected westerner, to the caliphate in Syria, which was advertised in glowing terms. This 
was all the more potent because the pair had met online: if Hussain could bring her to the 
caliphate, then he could potentially bring anyone with whom he conversed online.  
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Micro-Celebrity Practices 
 How did Hussain put this personal brand into action? First, he was very active on 
Twitter. Hussain’s tweets often represented his personal brand. From his @AbuHussain102 
profile, he tweeted “You can sit at home and play call of duty or you can come here and 
respond to the real call of duty…the choice is yours.”335 Hussain was challenging others to 
recreate his shift in persona from hacker who sits behind a computer to terrorist who takes 
action in the real world. Additionally, Hussain would continually create new Twitter 
accounts as his various profiles were suspended by the company. This suspension and 
account creation cycle was a standard part of the Twitter experience for Islamic State 
members and supporters.336 However, for a micro-celebrity practitioner, it is an essential 
element of keeping up their profile and staying relevant and accessible to followers. 
Hussain also focused on the micro-celebrity practice of strategically interacting with 
fans. Once Hussain and a follower had met on Twitter, he often directed them to move to 
encrypted applications for personal and secure conversations. The app SureSpot appears to 
have been his program of choice, but he also used Kik and Telegram. Moreover, Hussain 
made this transition easy: in some of his early Twitter accounts, he listed his SureSpot 
account name in his Twitter bio, which is prominently displayed directly under the profile 
photo at the top of the account page. Australian planner Neil Prakash did the same thing: his 
SureSpot account name was in his Twitter bio of the @AbuK_313 account.337 In this manner, 
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Hussain could either provide the follower with the means of discretely contacting him or they 
could take the initiative themselves. 
John Miller explained this transition from Twitter to personal communication thusly: 
The thing that ISIS does is they really understand their audience. They have 
some very convincing material, for example putting out compelling videos 
glorifying fighters from the West killed in battle. That’s to get you into the 
tent. What they do after that goes from brilliant to genius. They start to talk to 
you personally. If you look at the postings of Junaid Hussain, who was a 
British individual who went by the Twitter handle Abu Hussain-al-Britani, he 
would post such things as, “You no longer need to go to a training camp to 
learn everything you need to know; you can get it all online.” And people 
would respond with questions or comments, and he would say, “Meet me on 
my Kik account.” Then he would talk to them directly.338  
That transition allowed followers to feel a real sense of connection to Hussain, and by 
extension, the Islamic State. 
 Hussain’s brand as a fighter is also evident in his tweets and interactions with 
followers. Many of Hussain’s tweets involved threats against the enemies of the Islamic 
State. In July of 2015 he threatened that “soon we will send our ‘drones’ to attack you in 
your lands” and that “spears” from Islamic State terrorists would “reach the lands of the 
crusaders.”339 Hussain kept up this persona when interacting one-on-one with followers. One 
hallmark of Hussain’s plots was a contingency plan: in many of his virtual plots, he 
                                                           
338 Maria Southard, “A View from the CT Foxhole: John J. Miller, NYPD Deputy Commissioner for 
Intelligence & Counterterrorism, with Ambassador Michael Sheehan,” CTC Sentinel 9, no. 3 (March 2016), 7.  
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instructed his operatives to regularly carry a knife to stab any authorities that tried to 
apprehend them.340 Just as he was presenting himself as a hardened fighter, Hussain was 
getting others he met on the internet to do the same. 
Celebrity Significance 
Due to his micro-celebrity practices both publically on Twitter and privately through 
communication with supporters, Hussain became a key figure in the online community of 
English-speaking Islamic State supporters. As Hughes and Meleagrou-Hitchens describe, 
“Hussain gained such respect among English-speaking Islamic State supporters around the 
world that they were also sought out online in order to give their blessing for attacks.”341 In 
several cases, operatives reached out to Hussain first because they knew of his reputation. 
 Hussain is connected to at least nine virtually planned foiled plots or successful 
attacks. The operatives Hussain recruited or was approached by were mostly young people. 
The youngest was 17, and the oldest was 34. The average age of operatives working with 
Hussain was 23.5 (see figure 4.1). In most cases, Hussain provided technical expertise or 
operational suggestions to his followers as they decided how to carry out an attack.  
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Figure 4.1: Junaid Hussain Connected or Directed Plots and Attacks 
Name of Operative Date Digital 
Platforms 
Used 
Type of Plot/Attack Age of 
Operative 
Munir Abdulkader May 2015 Twitter Beheading plot 21 
Justin Sullivan June 2015 Twitter Shooting plot 19 
Garland, Texas May 3, 
2015 
Twitter, 
SureSpot 
Art exhibit attack 30, 34 
Usaamah Abdulla 
Rahim (and David 
Wright and Nicholas 
Rovinski) 
June 2015 Twitter, 
Kik 
Attempted police 
stabbing 
25, 24, 26 
Ardet Ferizi June 2015 Twitter U.S. service member 
personal information 
hacking 
19 
Armed Forces Day 
Plot 
June 2015 Kik, 
SureSpot 
Parade bomb plot - 
Munther Omar Saleh 
and Fareed Mumuni 
June 2015 Twitter Police bombing plot 21, 22 
Junead Khan July 2015 SureSpot RAF base bomb plot 24 
Melbourne Mother’s 
Day plot 
May 2015 Facebook, 
SureSpot 
Bomb plot 17 
    Average: 
23.5 
 
 The Hussain cases demonstrate several implications of terrorist micro-celebrity. First 
there is the draw of Hussain’s celebrity status and the manner in which he evoked his 
personal brand in interactions with followers. In May 2015, Hussain promised to give Ohio 
resident Munir Abdulkader the address of a soldier who served at a nearby military base, 
with instructions that Abdulkader should film a beheading video.342 Abdulkader reached out 
to Hussain first: “the defendant was the one who reached out and met these ISIL operatives 
in Syria online by himself and began communicating with them directly, not just Hussain, but 
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others. That was all done at the defendant's own initiative.”343 This doesn’t necessarily point 
to celebrity as a factor. Abdulkader appears to be a determined US citizen who was going to 
take the initiative to reach out to the Islamic State anyways. Yet it was Hussain’s profile and 
reputation within the online community of Islamic State supporters that likely led 
Abdulkader to specifically seek out Hussain for guidance.  
In line with most of his plots, the two initially conversed over Twitter DMs and then 
moved to encrypted chat apps. Abdulkader wished to travel to Syria, but Hussain steered him 
towards an attack in the United States.344 Even though he was not very involved, Hussain 
bragged to Abdulkader about his connection to the May 2015 attack on the Prophet 
Muhammad cartoon contest in Garland, Texas.345 This demonstrates Hussain’s personal 
brand of being a hardened fighter in Syria. Hussain wanted recruits to trust him and his 
expertise; from the court proceedings: “this is really significant to this case because you had 
Hussain reaching out to Munir directly telling him that he helped direct [the Garland, Texas] 
attack, and then he was trying to pursue the same thing through others, makes a statement to 
the effect of "There's more to come."346 
The newest iteration of terrorist micro-celebrity allows for a new and powerful form 
of strategic interaction: near constant communication. In the Justin Sullivan case, Hussain 
and Sullivan texted on June 19, 2015 about filming an attack that Sullivan would commit.347 
Sullivan planned to commit the attack the next week, but was arrested that night after asking 
                                                           
343 United States v. Munir Abdulkader (2016), Sentencing Proceedings, available online at 
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344 Idem, 55.  
345 Hughes and Meleagrou-Hitchens, “The Threat to the United States,” 6. 
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an informant to kill Sullivan’s parents.348 Similarly, Hussain and Abdulkader conversed 
“right up until the last day…about who they would want to target.”349 
In this sense, improvements in technology allow for operatives to be in constant 
communication with their terrorist celebrities, even up to the moment of an attack. In another 
virtually planned attack in Germany, a man trying to plant a bomb was denied entry into his 
target, a music festival in Ansbach. His handler quickly came up with a new plan and urged 
the operative to complete the task, writing “forget the festival and go over to the restaurant. 
Hey man, what is going on with you? Even if just two people were killed, I would do it. Trust 
in Allah and walk straight up to the restaurant.”350 The 27 year-old then walked over to a 
wine bar and his backpack bomb accidentally exploded, causing his death and injuring 15.351  
Additionally, there is an element of celebrity on the part of the virtual operative who 
the celebrity foreign fighter is directing. This manifests itself in two ways. First, virtually 
planned operations are sometimes used as tests. An early example of this dynamic is the July 
2006 train bombing plot in Germany, when two Lebanese students who wished to join Al 
Qaeda in Iraq were asked to conduct an attack in Germany first to prove themselves before 
traveling to Iraq.352 Six months prior to planting the bombs, one plotter emailed another 
saying that they had to wait to pass “the initiation test. Then we will travel to Iraq 
together.”353 This pattern was repeated in some of the Islamic State’s virtually planned 
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attacks; in 2014 an Austrian teenager was promised $25,000 and a position with IS in Syria if 
he carried out an attack in Austria first.354 In these types of plots, the attack serves as a test of 
loyalty, both to the terrorist organization and the micro-celebrity planner. 
Secondly, there is the use of allegiance and martyrdom videos in virtually planned 
operations that represent the operative’s ability to gain celebrity status. The Islamic State has 
taken the practice of martyrdom videos started by Hezbollah in the 1980s and used it as a key 
part of the virtual plotting process. Whether or not the attack is a suicide mission, operatives 
are asked to create a video of allegiance before their attack, which is then sent to the virtual 
planner to be used in official Islamic State propaganda.355 Once the video is sent to the 
Islamic State, it is then edited and branded with the Amaq logo and released to the IS 
Telegram community with the intention that the swarm would fan it out to other online sites 
and platforms for maximum visibility.”356 During one text conversation between Hussain and 
Sullivan, the latter proudly announced “Very soon carrying out 1st operation of Islamic State 
in North America…U will see on news.”357 Hussain responded “Can u make a video first?”358 
The video serves two purposes: acting as an element of pre-commitment on the part of the 
operative and creating an incentive for the operative to achieve their own celebrity status 
after their attack. 
Conclusion 
 Junaid Hussain represents the culmination of the technological and cultural shifts that 
enabled Awlaki to gain celebrity status. Awlaki spoke to the broad masses of English-
                                                           
354 Justin Huggler, “Isil jihadists 'offered teenager $25,000 to carry out bombings in Vienna',” The Telegraph, 
October 30, 2014, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11199628/Boy-14-who-planned-
Vienna-bombings-was-recruited-on-internet-by-Isil.html  
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speaking Muslims through his sermons and writings. Yet he directly communicated with a 
handful of people and only occasionally actually incited violence and engaged in operational 
planning. In contrast, Hussain was directly linked to at least nine plots and plausibly recruited 
many more individuals to travel to Syria. He was constantly available on encrypted chat 
platforms. Hussain, who grew up with the early platforms, was communicating with many 
young people like him who were comfortable with quick digital communication and expected 
it. This communication amongst digital natives meant that Hussain was a more easily 
accessible celebrity. His celebrity status may have been narrower than Awlaki’s, but changes 
in culture and technology allowed for more frequent strategic interaction with followers. Yet 
this celebrity status also had a limit: once Hussain was killed, those interactions disappeared 
and he could be replaced by another planner. Thus, Hussain’s celebrity did not live on in the 
same way as Awlaki’s martyrdom. 
  
Weil 103 
 
Chapter Five: Conclusion 
Anwar al Awlaki to Junaid Hussain: The Evolution of Micro-Celebrity 
While Anwar al Awlaki and Junaid Hussain both practiced micro-celebrity, they 
approached online branding and interaction in distinct ways. With his early use of social 
media, Awlaki opened the door for terrorists like Hussain, who engage in the mainstream 
online micro-celebrity culture. This section analyzes the previous two case studies and 
identifies key findings from both, as well as comparing and contrasting the celebrity 
mannerisms of both men. 
Personal Branding 
 Awlaki and Hussain had several similarities in their personal branding. Both targeted 
English-speaking Muslims living in the West. As former residents of the United States and 
United Kingdom, respectively, the two were able to relate to the experiences of those still 
living there. Both maintained brands online and ensured that their output was consistently on-
brand. Awlaki started this with his blog, Facebook page, and Inspire articles. Hussain, in 
turn, maintained his brand on Twitter and private communications.  
However, while there is overlap between the populations the two were recruiting, 
Hussain’s personal brand was narrower. He was specifically marketing himself as a member 
of the Islamic State, while Awlaki leaned on his theological persona and ability to make jihad 
more accessible. Another difference is the organizational context in which the two were 
operating. As the primary spokesperson for AQAP, Awlaki served as the public face of the 
group. In contrast, by setting out to attract recruits from around the world, the Islamic State 
ended up with one or two micro-celebrities from each country with a sizable foreign fighter 
contingent. In turn, each virtual planner was responsible for recruiting from their country of 
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origin or from a country where they spoke the language. Thus, the celebrity burden was 
dispersed among the many foreign fighters rather than being concentrated in a single figure.  
Micro-celebrity Practices 
With his blog and YouTube videos, Awlaki opened the door for Hussain by 
participating fully in the micro-celebrity culture of marketing a branded persona through 
online media. Hussain then expanded with frequent Twitter postings and personal chats with 
supporters. Technology had changed in two important ways. First, Awlaki was operating in 
the early stages of social media. By the time Hussain joined the Islamic State, social media 
platforms were more mature and more mainstream, so there was a larger pool of regular users 
with whom Hussain could interact. Secondly, encryption became much more common. 
Hussain no longer needed to use the convoluted four-step encryption process implemented by 
Awlaki and the Karim brothers. Rather, Hussain could merely tell any potential recruit to 
download a messaging app with built-in end-to-end encryption (SureSpot being Hussain’s 
platform of choice), and the two could have a secure conversation.  
Awlaki also opened the door for Hussain in terms of operational planning. He 
demonstrated that, for the first time, an unaffiliated individual could reach out and ask 
someone famous in a terrorist organization for permission to conduct an attack. Yet Awlaki 
largely did not engage in operational planning. He only planned one attack in person (Umar 
Farouk Abdulmutallab) and attempted one virtual plot (Rajib Karim). Many of Awlaki’s 
interactions with supporters were limited to Awlaki giving his blessing for an action or 
explaining the theological rationale, without trying to recruit and train a follower or plan an 
attack.  
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Hussain took this and greatly expanded it with his nine virtually planned plots and 
attacks. Hussain and the rest of the virtual planners fully operationalized micro-celebrity by 
recruiting some of the people they met online and assisting them in planning attacks around 
the world. As a baseline, the virtual planners were more accessible than Awlaki with new 
digital platforms available, but they also chose to engage more in personal interactions with 
followers. Thus, while they did have public postings on Twitter to advertise their personal 
brands, Hussain and the virtual planners differed from Awlaki in that they focused heavily on 
interacting with followers and strengthening their brand with each follower through personal 
communication. 
Martyrdom 
A stark difference between Awlaki and Hussain is their post-mortem celebrity status. 
While AQAP deliberately maintained Awlaki’s celebrity status as a martyr, there are no clear 
signs of martyrdom status for Hussain. A comparison to Anwar al-Awlaki’s martyrdom helps 
to illustrate this point. The Islamic State has not fronted Hussain’s image or deeds as AQAP 
and AQ did for Awlaki. Whereas Awlaki was continually referenced in AQAP’s magazine, 
Hussain made no appearances in the Islamic State’s two online English-language magazines, 
Dabiq and Rumiyah.  
The reasons for this discrepancy can be found in the different ways in which Awlaki 
and Hussain operated. Hussain was involved in jihadist terrorism for a much shorter period 
of time, and spent only two years in Syria. Additionally, Hussain did not have nearly as large 
a public profile as Awlaki. But this is because Hussain operated much differently. Rather 
than having a large presence (such as Awlaki’s persona that was widely disseminated 
through video and audio lectures), Hussain used one-on-one interpersonal interactions. This 
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made his celebrity much narrower, but also allowed for a greater feeling of intimacy because 
that narrow audience had access to constant contact with their celebrity figure. Without the 
broader status, Hussain could not as easily or as effectively be martyred as Awlaki was.  
Additionally, Hussain’s main methods of raising his profile were through large 
actions (hacking) and direct communications (Twitter DMs and encrypted chat). Once 
Hussain was killed, he could no longer conduct a large hacking operation, post on Twitter, or 
chat one-on-one with someone. Not only did he lose his ability to maintain celebrity, but 
there is largely no trace left of his actions: his Twitter was taken down and he was not alive 
to create a new account, his hacks have been forgotten, and he is unable to recruit anymore. 
This lack of an extant posthumous body of work helps explain why Hussain was less suited 
for martyrdom than Awlaki.  
Yet one question still remains about the organization’s role. Why did AQAP 
purposefully maintain Awlaki’s martyr status while IS does not appear to have done much at 
all with regards to Hussain? With the exception perhaps of his hacking skills, Hussain was 
dispensable. The Islamic State had gained a whole cadre of micro-celebrities who could serve 
as virtual planners. In one case, Hussain told a recruit to contact another member of the 
Raqqa 12 via Twitter if anything happened.359  Even though Hussain’s high profile was key 
to drawing in supporters, his role as a facilitator and planner could be easily passed off to 
another individual. In contrast, there was only one Awlaki who served as the voice and face 
of AQAP to the Western world. Thus, AQAP made the conscious decision to keep Awlaki’s 
image alive as a martyr. 
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Shifting Norms in Terrorist Celebrity 
There has been an evolution in terrorist celebrity, first from the broad-based and 
external media-dependent traditional celebrity to, after that, the martyrdom status created by 
the organization to target the local community, and, finally, over the last fifteen years, to the 
terrorist internet micro-celebrity, who maintains a specific personal brand and cultivates a 
following through content consistent with the brand. Yet it is important to delineate which of 
these shifts are due to new technology and which are due to changes in celebrity and 
consumption culture. 
Technological Changes 
 The overall technological changes were identified in chapter two; namely, the shift 
from traditional print media to live television, then to home video, and then to the internet. 
The clearest technological shift within the last two decades has been the rapidly evolving 
types of social media. The early social media platforms have improved greatly and a host of 
additional platforms and startups have emerged. The ease of communication provided by 
direct messaging on Twitter allowed Islamic State foreign fighters to connect with 
sympathizers around the world. And the ease of switching over to an encrypted chat 
application made it simple to keep up those conversations. Both of those factors combined to 
make it easier to have personal and protected conversations, which in turn creates a sense of 
intimacy with the celebrity in question. In short, terrorist celebrities are more accessible than 
ever. 
Cultural Changes 
 In terms of cultural changes, the conception of celebrity has changed over time. 
Celebrity in general, particularly because of internet micro-celebrity practice, is becoming 
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more narrowly focused. This clearly held in the case of terrorist celebrity with the evolution 
from the traditional celebrity that spoke to a wide audience to the micro-celebrity who speaks 
largely only to a small group of potential recruits.  
One trend observed is that authenticity has become more important in personal 
branding. In 2015, Hussain conversed with North Carolina resident Justin Sullivan about a 
potential shooting mass-casualty attack. In his statement to federal agents, Sullivan stated 
that he knew who Hussain was and that he was a British national who had been jailed but 
now lived in Syria.360 This stands in stark contrast to earlier terrorist micro-celebrities. For 
example, “Irhabi007” was a pseudonym because Younes Tsouli needed to protect his 
identity. Yet in this case, Hussain’s real, authentic identity was a key part of his personal 
brand. Hussain may have been using a kunya but his face was visible on his profile and it 
was integral that followers like Sullivan knew that Hussain was a foreign fighter with the 
Islamic State. Part of this trend in using real identities is that individuals such as Awlaki and 
Hussain were in safe havens and were thus free to share their identities, while Tsouli lived in 
east London and needed discretion. Yet it still shows an important shift. Sharing one’s real 
identity creates authenticity in the personal brand. Individuals connected with Awlaki 
because they knew of his experience as a Muslim in the West and with Hussain because they 
knew he was a foreign fighter with the Islamic State; that was not the case for Tsouli, who 
proved his worth through feats done under the cover of anonymity. 
Lastly, there is an atomization of celebrity. As mentioned, the transition from Awlaki 
to the virtual planners shows the dispersion of celebrity from one individual to many. This is 
a natural extension of increasing celebrity consumption culture. If Gabler’s model of 
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celebrity supply and demand is applied, there was an increase in the diversity of terrorist 
celebrities because of greater demand: the Islamic State attracted a worldwide following and 
needed individuals to represent that diversity and appeal to the demand in each country of 
origin for a relatable figurehead. Yet this atomization also leads to less martyrdom, because 
each smaller celebrity is less well-known and can be replaced by someone with a similar 
profile. 
Overlap Between Technology and Culture 
There are also effects resulting from a confluence of changes in both technology and 
culture. Overall, there is less reliance on traditional media. It is much easier to post one’s 
own content now (enabled by technology) and consumer expectations have changed about 
where to get content (a change in culture). Thus, there has been a transition from celebrity 
status created by the mainstream media to one created by the organization (martyrs, as well 
as partially for Awlaki and the Islamic State fighters featured in propaganda videos) to a 
celebrity status created by the individual (Hussain and the Islamic State virtual planners).  
Additionally, many terrorist recruits today are digital natives. Terrorism has always 
largely attracted young recruits, and this held true in the wave of foreign terrorist fighters to 
the Syrian conflict.361 This generation grew up with the internet and digital communications, 
and is comfortable with meeting others online. Not only are terrorist celebrities more 
accessible due to new technology, there is also a group of young people who grew up 
expecting this kind of accessibility. This sense of intimacy from constant contact is created 
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through both the technology that facilitates it and the culture that leads young people to 
expect and crave it.362  
Lastly, terrorist celebrities are largely no longer speaking to an audience, but rather 
engaging with communities. This denotes the difference between unidirectional and 
multidirectional communication. In the traditional terrorist celebrity type, Osama bin Laden 
(and his successor Ayman al Zawahiri) would release video statements that spoke to both 
supporters and detractors. However, due to both the change in technology with the advent of 
social media and the shift in cultural norms around celebrity, today’s terrorist micro-
celebrities are regularly engaging with the radical milieu to find and converse with potential 
recruits. The comments section of Awlaki’s blog became a place for followers around the 
world to converse and connect.  
Moreover, the interpersonal interaction itself helps to build the celebrity profile. For 
example, take the case of the 2016 Indonesian Presidential Palace Plot.363 The Indonesian 
virtual planner Bahrun Naim first worked with cell leader Muhammad Nur Solikin and urged 
him to recruit several others. Once Solikin had built a cell, Naim then conversed with the rest 
of the group through one-on-one and group chat messages.364 And in a telling example of the 
allure of online celebrity profiles, Solikin had tried for six months to get into contact with 
Naim.365 
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Future Directions in Terrorist Celebrity 
 What will terrorist celebrity look like next? One important factor to acknowledge is 
the overlap between the organization and the individual. For both Awlaki and Hussain, their 
individual celebrity was, to some extent, building off of the popularity of the organization. In 
both cases, the organization was the most prominent in the transnational jihad movement at 
the time, AQAP in 2009-2011 and the Islamic State from 2013-2017. This contributed not 
only to their celebrity status, but also to what type of celebrity they became. Both AQAP’s 
regional focus and AQ’s focus on attacking the US were well-suited to a central figurehead 
targeting English speakers. The Islamic State’s truly global recruitment effort lent itself to 
decentralized micro-celebrities targeting various constituencies with matching personal 
brands. Thus, the next phase of terrorist celebrity may depend entirely on which jihadi 
organization emerges as most prominent after the Islamic State. 
 On that note, several analysts have identified a resurgent Al Qaeda in the aftermath of 
global counterterrorism efforts focused on the Islamic State over the last four years.366 And 
Al Qaeda may have a ready-made celebrity in the wings: Hamza bin Laden, Osama’s favored 
son.367 This could lead to a form of inherited celebrity, based on name recognition. It is likely 
that Hamza would seek to build on and remain consistent with his father’s brand. This may 
manifest itself in a return to a traditional type of celebrity, where statements are released to 
mass media outlets. Or Hamza’s celebrity could appear much like Awlaki’s, through 
speeches and writings released by the terrorist organization itself. Al Qaeda is aware of this 
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potential; Soufan points to the fact that Hamza “has been featured in al-Qa`ida propaganda 
from a very young age,” often focusing on his close relationship with Osama.368 
 Regardless, it remains clear that mainstream technological and cultural shifts drive 
changes in mainstream celebrity, and by extension (albeit with a lag time), terrorist celebrity. 
For those interested in what will happen next, they need only look to the micro-celebrity 
practitioners of the coming decade to see how terrorist celebrity will evolve. 
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